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OFF TO ELBA!1 THE LEGITIMACY OF SEX OFFENDER
RESIDENCE AND EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS
Joseph L. Lester*
There are times when politicians are hostages to the lusts of their
constituents. They dare not oppose bills that, if defeated, would serve
only to aggravate those who placed them into office.2 Regardless of
whether they actually favor the measures, the political risk is too great
not to allow their constituents’ passions to overrun their own common
sense. As a consequence, laws are passed with little or no resistance.3
These laws can fundamentally alter the liberties and freedom of a few to
satisfy the ignorant fear of the masses. As a result, laws that in theory
appear to protect society, in practice only exacerbate the perceived
problem. In situations like this, an independent judiciary must do what
needs to be done. Because sometimes the desire of the majority
overbears individual liberty, it is critical that the courts protect the
*

Joseph L. Lester is a Professor of Law at Faulkner University, Thomas Goode Jones School of
Law, in Montgomery, Alabama. The author would like to thank John Craft (J.D. candidate, 2007)
for his excellent and tireless research for this article.
1. Elba is the island Napoleon was exiled to until his attempt to retake the French Crown
after which he was sent to St. Helena to live in exile the remaining six years of his life.
2. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
529-530 (2001).
3. See
e.g.,
Georgia
General
Assembly
Homepage,
http://www.legis.ga.gov/legis/2005_06/sum/hb1059.htm (last visited March 4, 2007) (showing that
H.B.
1059,
148th
Gen.
Assem.,
Reg.
Sess.
(Ga.
2006),
available
at
http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2005_06/versions/hb1059_HB_1059_AP_11.htm, which radically
limited the areas in which a sex offender could live and work passed the State Senate 52 to 1);
Activist Judges Last Hope of Democratic Party, Georgia Republican Party, (July 10, 2006),
http://www.gagop.org/default.asp?pt=newsdescr&RI=211; John Curran, Sex-offender Zones
Assailed – Critics Say Ordinances Limiting Where Offenders can Live are Ineffective and too
Broad, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Aug. 22, 2005, at B01. The town of Brick, New Jersey, included
school bus stops in its list of locations an offender is prohibited from living 2,500 feet from. Id.
“With more than 2,000 bus stops . . . the measure effectively bars offenders from living anywhere in
the town.” Id. “It’s pretty tough, if someone introduces an ordinance like this, to vote no,” said
Brick Mayor Joseph Scarpelli. Id. “I know they’ll probably have a case that tests all these
ordinances, and there’s a good possibility a lot will be thrown out as unconstitutional. But it makes
a town feel that they care about their children.” Id.
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legitimate interests of “the others.”4 When such laws are passed and the
political process is broken, it is necessary for the judicial branch to step
forward and protect those who are politically impotent.5
When it comes to laws that involve sex offenders, the passions of
the majority must be tempered with reason. Overborne by a mob
mentality for justice, officials at every level of government are enacting
laws that effectively exile convicted sex offenders from their midst with
little contemplation as to the appropriateness or constitutionality of their
actions. Politicians across the country will approve almost any measure
that deals with sex offenders to appear strong on crime.6 Given that the
sex offender lobby is neither large nor vocal, it will be up to the courts to
protect the interests of this disenfranchised group.7
This article does not dispute the idea that sex offenders should be
dealt with harshly. But there has to be a time when enough is enough.
The law should provide some opportunity for repentance.8 Individuals
make mistakes, but they should be allowed an opportunity to change.
Individuals like Lori Sue Collins, who after serving three years for
having sex with a teenage boy, found God.9 Upon her release, she
worked as the residence director at the Door of Hope, a halfway house
for sex offenders.10 She believed her calling was to help others like her
4. See The Other, Otherness, and Alterity, http://www.postcolonialweb.org/poldiscourse/
themes/other.html (last modified: April 8, 2002).
5. See Wayne A. Logan, “Democratic Despotism” and Constitutional Constraint: An
Empirical Analysis of Ex Post Facto Claims in State Courts, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 439,
495-96 (2004).
6. See Lee Rood, New Data Shows Twice as Many Sex Offenders Missing, DES MOINES
REGISTER & TRIBUNE, Jan. 22, 2006 (quoting state Sen. Dick Deardon, Dem. who thought sex
offender registration requirement would be “difficult to change” since “[n]o one wants a postcard to
come out two weeks before the election saying they are lax on sex offenders”).
7. Relying on politicians to act against their constituents’ wishes to benefit an unpopular
minority is wishful thinking. “There is obviously little legislative hay to be made in cultivating the
multiple murderer vote.” Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 522 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-55 (1964) (standing for the proposition
that the political process should be balanced and fair to everyone, providing “one person, one
vote”).
8. See, e.g., State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 443 (Alaska 1970) (“The primary goal of such
legislation is an attempt to implement Alaska’s constitutional mandate that [p]enal administration
shall be based on the principle of reformation and upon the need for protecting the public.”)
(citation omitted). See also ALA. CODE § 13A-1-3(5)-(6) (Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.)
(stating that the purpose of the criminal code is “[t]o insure the public safety by . . . the
rehabilitation of those convicted . . . [t]o prevent the arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons
accused or convicted of offenses”).
9. Complaint ¶ 39, Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-cv-140-CC, (N.D. Ga. June 20, 2006),
available at http://www.schr.org/aboutthecenter/pressreleases/HB1059_litigation/LegalDocuments/
HB1059_Complaint.pdf.
10. Id. ¶ 38.
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turn away from the sins of their past and live as productive members of
society.11 But because the Door of Hope is located within 1,000 feet of a
school bus stop, Lori had to quit her job and move because of residence
and employment restrictions.12
This article will look at why sex offenders are treated differently
than other criminal offenders. Sex offenders are subject to sanctions and
prohibitions above and beyond what other criminal offenders must face.
Next, the article will look at some of the residence and employment
restrictions placed on sex offenders to determine if they are rationally
related to any legitimate government interest without overbearing the
sex offender’s constitutional rights. Finally, the article will offer an
alternate means of sex offense prevention that encourages sex offender
assimilation back into society instead of further exclusion.
This article will focus on those individuals who have been
classified as sex offenders and who have successfully completed their
sentence, however long it may have been. This article does not deal
with laws aimed at restricting the freedom of individuals released on
probation or parole. Any type of supervised release is a contractual
agreement between the individual and the state and any rights an
individual wishes to waive to have some limited degree of freedom are
within the individual’s discretion and the state’s prerogative to require.
There is no such bargain for those who have completed their sentence.
Society has an obligation to those who have paid their debt for the
wrong committed to accept a convict’s repentance.13 There should be at
least some opportunity for that individual to assimilate back into society.
However, the residence and employment laws currently promulgated by
twenty-four states and many other local communities around the country
serve only to exile those who desire a second chance at life.14 Instead of
11. Id.
12. Id. ¶ 40.
13. Provided that the offender has served his/her time and actually seeks to turn away from
his/her previous deviant behavior.
14. There are nineteen states with residence restrictions, not a condition of
probation/parole/supervision, in order of enactment or latest amendments. The terms in parentheses
indicate whether the classification is Offense Driven (OD), Registration Driven (RD), or applies to
Sexually Violent Predators (SVP). Delaware (July 25, 1995) (OD); Alabama (Sept. 1, 1999) (OD);
Illinois (July 7, 2000) (OD, SVP); Louisiana (June 28, 2001) (SVP); Iowa (July 1, 2002) (OD);
Arkansas (July 16, 2003) (RD+SVP); Ohio (July 31, 2003) (OD); Oklahoma (Nov. 1, 2003) (RD);
Tennessee (June 8, 2004) (RD); Missouri (June 14, 2004) (OD); Florida (Oct. 1, 2004) (OD);
Michigan (Jan. 1, 2006) (RD); Georgia (July 1, 2006) (RD); Idaho (July 1, 2006) (RD); Indiana
(July 1, 2006) (RD); Mississippi (July 1, 2006) (RD); South Dakota (July 1, 2006) (RD); Virginia
(July 1, 2006) (OD); Kentucky (July 12, 2006) (RD). See infra Table 1 for citations. Eight
states have a residence restriction as a condition of probation/parole/supervision: ARIZ. REV. STAT.
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protecting society, these laws actually push individuals into antisocial
behavior and likely back into trouble with the law. But besides simply
being bad public policy, these laws are contrary to the ordered scheme of
liberty that we hold so dear. As Justice McKenna so eloquently put it
almost 100 years ago:
His prison bars and chains are removed, it is true, after twelve years,
but he goes from them to a perpetual limitation of his liberty. He is
forever kept under the shadow of his crime, forever kept within voice
and view of the criminal magistrate, not being able to change his
domicile without giving notice to the “authority immediately in charge
of his surveillance,” and without permission in writing. He may not
seek, even in other scenes and among other people, to retrieve his fall
from rectitude. Even that hope is taken from him, and he is subject to
tormenting regulations that, if not so tangible as iron bars and
stonewalls, oppress as much by their continuity, and deprive of
essential liberty.15

I. WHO IS A SEX OFFENDER?
A lawbreaker is a sex offender if he or she is guilty of one of the
many enumerated crimes that constitute a sex offense. The definition of
what is a sex offense is set forth by statute and varies from state to state.
In some states the list is short, while in others the list is extensive. The
status of being a sex offender may not be limited to individuals with
felony convictions. Even a Class A misdemeanor conviction can result
in being labeled a sex offender.16 For most states there is a three prong
§ 41-1604.07(F) (LexisNexis 2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003(g) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 910
of 2006 Reg. Sess.); FLA. STAT. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (2006); FLA. STAT. § 948.30(1)(b) (2006); IND.
CODE ANN. § 11-13-3-4(g)(2)(B) (West 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-2-2.2(2) (West 2006); LA.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15:538(D)(1)(c) (2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 144.642(1)(a) (2006); TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12(13B) (Vernon 2006); W. VA. CODE § 62-12-26(b)(1) (2006).
15. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910).
16. For example, in Illinois, where the residence restrictions is offense driven, one of the
offenses is “indecent solicitation of an adult.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(c)(2.5) (2006). A
person who arranges for a person 17 years of age or over to commit an act of sexual conduct with a
person 13 or older but under 17 commits a Class A misdemeanor. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/11-6.5
(2006). In Michigan, a second or subsequent conviction for indecent exposure subjects you to the
residence restriction. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.722(e)(iii) (2006). Indecent exposure is a
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment up to two years, or a fine up to $2,000, or both. MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 750.335a(2)(b) (2006). In Missouri, furnishing pornographic material to minors
subjects you to the residence restriction. MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.147(1) (West 2006). Furnishing
pornographic material to minors is a Class A misdemeanor. MO. ANN. STAT. § 573.040(2) (West
2006). Indecent exposure subjects you to the residence restriction in Oklahoma. OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 57, § 582(A) (West 2006). Although the crime is categorized as a felony, the punishment ranges
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designation for sex offender registration which subjects them to the
residence and employment restrictions. A sex offender typically is a
person convicted of a sexually violent offense, deemed a sexually
violent predator, or convicted of a criminal offense against a victim who
is a minor.17
The interesting aspect about this classification scheme as it relates
to residence and employment restrictions is that for two of the three
categories it does not matter whether the victim of the underlying crime
is a child. So a person who is convicted of sex abuse against another
adult is prohibited from living or working where children congregate as
if he or she were a child molester. Focusing on the child victim is not
clear enough either. Some states limit the status of “sex offender” to
“child sex offender” in which case only crimes where the victim is a
minor are considered.18 Crimes against adults are not used in that
particular classification.19 For this classification, it does not matter if
there is any sexual intent involved—only that the victim of the crime is a
child. For these restrictions to be rationally related to the interests of
protecting children from sexual criminals, the crimes which classify
convicts as sex offenders should at a minimum include a sexual act and a
child.20
from a fine of $500 to $20,000, imprisonment from 30 days to 10 years, or both. OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 1021(A) (West 2006). You could plead guilty, pay a $500 fine, and be forced out of your
home.
17. See GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.1 (West 2006).
18. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(c)(1) (defining a “child sex offender” as a
“person who[] (i) has been charged . . . with a sex offense . . . or the attempt to commit an included
sex offense, and (A) is convicted . . . (B) is found not guilty by reason of insanity . . . or (D) is the
subject of a finding not resulting in an acquittal at a hearing . . . or (ii) is certified as a sexually
dangerous person . . . when any conduct giving rise to such certification is committed or attempted
against a person less than 18 years of age . . . .”).
19. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(c)(2.5) (defining sex offenses as child luring,
aiding and abetting in child abduction, indecent solicitation of a child, indecent solicitation of an
adult, soliciting for a juvenile prostitution, keeping a place of juvenile prostitution, patronizing a
juvenile prostitute, juvenile pimping, exploitation of a child, child pornography, predatory criminal
sexual assault of a child, ritualized abuse of a child, criminal sexual assault (when victim under 18
years of age), aggravated criminal sexual assault (when victim under 18 years of age), aggravated
criminal sexual abuse (when victim under 18 years of age), criminal sexual abuse (when victim
under 18 years of age), kidnapping (when victim under 18 years of age and defendant not parent),
aggravated kidnapping (when victim under 18 years of age and defendant not parent), unlawful
restraint (when victim under 18 years of age and defendant not parent), aggravated unlawful
restraint (when victim under 18 years of age and defendant not parent), and an attempt to commit
any of the aforementioned offenses).
20. See Raines v. State, 805 So.2d 999, 1003 (Fla. App. 4th 2001) (holding that “including an
offender convicted of false imprisonment in the definition of ‘sexual offender,’ without a
concomitant sexual component, renders the sexual offender registration statute overinclusive” and
in violation of equal protection).
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Many people may think of sex offenders as “dirty old men prowling
the streets,” but with the wide spectrum of offenses that automatically
lead to being classified as a sex offender, many times sex offenders are
decent people who made a mistake.21 Take Wendy Whitaker, for
example.22 At 17, she had consensual sexual relations with a 15-yearold boy.23 Now 26, and without any other mark on her criminal record,
she is a sex offender who is captured under Georgia’s sex offender
restrictions.24 Or Jay Hikes, who at the age of 19 had consensual sex
with a 15-year-old girl in New Jersey.25 Now 36, married and with a
small child, he too will be caught up in the broad net of sex offender
residence and employment restrictions.26 Silly mistakes and actions that
many people other would not have had qualms about doing could earn
individual the sex offender label.27 So, it is not just those who commit
rape, incest, and sex abuse who are branded a sex offender. There is a
significant probability that individuals with little potential to re-offend
are treated the same as those who actually are predators.28
In the handful of states where there are sex offender employment
and residence restrictions, sex offender status can be earned
automatically with a conviction of a particular crime. In Alabama, for
example, a conviction, even a nolo contendere plea, of the following will
result in sex offender classification: rape in the first or second degree;
sodomy in the first or second degree; sexual torture; sex abuse in the
first or second degree; enticing a child to enter a vehicle, room, house,
office, or other place for immoral purposes; promoting prostitution in the

21. See, e.g., Jenny Jarvie, Suit Target’s Georgia Sex Offender Law, L.A. TIMES, July 2,
2006, at A24.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Doug Nurse, Many Feel Impact of New Sex Offender Law, ATLANTA J. CONST., July 6,
2006.
26. Id.
27. A sex offender could just be a person who committed a mischievous act such as mooning
or streaking. See generally, Kaffie Sledge, Labels May Mislead, COLUMBUS LEDGER-ENQUIRER,
June 29, 2006. “For instance, if reported, relieving oneself outdoors (behind a tree on the golf
course or behind a building) could result in being charged with a sex offense. It’s a misdemeanor if
the witness is an adult; a felony if witnessed by a minor.” Id.
28. Sometimes innocent fun can be criminal. 8-Year-Old Charged For Sexual Conduct With
Sitter,
(KUTV
television
broadcast
July
28,
2005),
available
at
http://kutv.com/topstories/local_story_210004013.html. For example, a fourteen-year-old female
baby-sitter “dared” the 8-year-old boy, in a game of truth-or-dare, to touch her breasts, which he
did. Id. When he told his mother about it, she called the police and both the eight-year-old boy and
the fourteen-year-old baby-sitter where charged with lewdness with a minor. Id. The charges were
later dropped. Id.
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first or second degree; violation of the Alabama Child Pornography Act;
kidnapping of a minor, except by a parent, in the first or second degree;
incest, when the offender is an adult and the victim is a minor; soliciting
a child by computer for the purposes of committing a sexual act and
transmitting obscene material to a child by computer; any solicitation,
attempt, or conspiracy to commit any of the aforementioned offenses29
and a conviction for any criminal sex offense when the victim was under
the age of 12 and any offense involving child pornography.30
Sex offender status is painted with a broad brush, marking more
individuals than necessary. The label is one that should be avoided at all
costs. As a result, statutes that require automatic inclusion by those
convicted of particular crimes will likely make convictions for those
crimes more difficult to come by. As the time frame for potential
punishment is extended, many individuals accused of such crimes will
not be willing to accept a guilty plea regardless of the suggested
punishment.31 The status of being a sex offender is a long-term, even a
lifetime, marking. Such a stigma should be very narrowly applied, if at
all.
II. WHY ALL THE FUSS OVER THIS CRIME?
Sex offenders are a special cast of criminals that excite the general
public more than other run-of-the-mill criminals.32 The combination of
sex and violence makes for a story line that sells.33 Readers and viewers
are titillated by these often NC-17 rated stories. Throw a story line that
includes children into the mix with sex and violence and you have a
potential to create a lynch mob. Stories of just a few abused children
can unite the public to demand change.34 Media attention can blow a
29. ALA. CODE § 15-20-21(4) (Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.).
30. Id. § 15-20-21(5).
31. Even an offer of probated sentence might be rejected as a matter of course if the sex
offender label must attach. The fewer plea bargains the more trials. One might speculate that
within a brief period of time the bulk of the criminal cases tried will be sex offenses.
32. See Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through
Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 881-82 (2000). “Stories about crime involving children
in particular tap into a complex of concerns about modern life. Indeed, it is noteworthy that so many
of the moral panics of the nineties involved children in either a victim or an offender role (or in the
case of drug use, both victim and offender).” Id.
33. Popular television shows such as Law & Order: Special Victims Unit or Dateline NBC
use sex stories to capture and audience.
34. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat.
587.
SEC. 2. IN RECOGNITION OF JOHN AND REVÉ WALSH ON THE OCCASION OF
THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF ADAM WALSH’S ABDUCTION AND MURDER.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007

7

Akron Law Review, Vol. 40 [2007], Iss. 2, Art. 4
LESTERFINAL.DOC

346

3/30/2007 1:54:06 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[40:339

situation out of proportion so that it appears that isolated events are
really an epidemic.35 The laws often reflect the plight of the particular
(a) ADAM WALSH’S ABDUCTION AND MURDER.—On July 27, 1981, in
Hollywood, Florida, 6-year-old Adam Walsh was abducted at a mall. Two weeks later,
some of Adam’s remains were discovered in a canal more than 100 miles from his home.
Id. at 589.
SEC. 102. DECLARATION OF PURPOSE.
In order to protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against children, and in
response to the vicious attacks by violent predators against the victims listed below,
Congress in this Act establishes a comprehensive national system for the registration of
those offenders:
(1) Jacob Wetterling, who was 11 years old, was abducted in 1989 in Minnesota, and
remains missing.
(2) Megan Nicole Kanka, who was 7 years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted, and
murdered in 1994, in New Jersey.
(3) Pam Lychner, who was 31 years old, was attacked by a career offender in Houston,
Texas.
(4) Jetseta Gage, who was 10 years old, was kidnapped, sexually assaulted, and
murdered in 2005, in Cedar Rapids, Iowa.
(5) Dru Sjodin, who was 22 years old, was sexually assaulted and murdered in 2003, in
North Dakota.
(6) Jessica Lunsford, who was 9 years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted, buried
alive, and murdered in 2005, in Homosassa, Florida.
(7) Sarah Lunde, who was 13 years old, was strangled and murdered in 2005, in Ruskin,
Florida.
(8) Amie Zyla, who was 8 years old, was sexually assaulted in 1996 by a juvenile
offender in Waukesha, Wisconsin, and has become an advocate for child victims and
protection of children from juvenile sex offenders.
(9) Christy Ann Fornoff, who was 13 years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted, and
murdered in 1984, in Tempe, Arizona.
(10) Alexandra Nicole Zapp, who was 30 years old, was brutally attacked and murdered
in a public restroom by a repeat sex offender in 2002, in Bridgewater, Massachusetts.
(11) Polly Klaas, who was 12 years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted, and murdered
in 1993 by a career offender in California.
(12) Jimmy Ryce, who was 9 years old, was kidnapped and murdered in Florida on
September 11, 1995.
(13) Carlie Brucia, who was 11 years old, was abducted and murdered in Florida in
February, 2004.
(14) Amanda Brown, who was 7 years old, was abducted and murdered in Florida in
1998.
(15) Elizabeth Smart, who was 14 years old, was abducted in Salt Lake City, Utah in
June 2002.
(16) Molly Bish, who was 16 years old, was abducted in 2000 while working as a
lifeguard in Warren, Massachusetts, where her remains were found 3 years later.
(17) Samantha Runnion, who was 5 years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted, and
murdered in California on July 15, 2002.
Id. at 590-91.
35. For example, anytime there is a shark attack, news coverage of such an event gives people
a false perception that shark attacks are common. Jennifer Hile, Great White Shark Attacks:
Defanging
the
Myths,
NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC
CHANNEL,
Jan.
23,
2004,
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2004/01/0123_040123_tvgreatwhiteshark.html.
In
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child who precipitated the law by carrying their names, such as Kyle,
Megan, or Jessica.36
Crimes involving sex, especially when the victim is a child, are
perceived as more heinous crimes because the degree of violation of our
personal privacy and innocence. Victims of sex crimes rarely just walk
away from the incident without some physical or emotional scarring. In
fact, nearly one-third of all rape victims, regardless of age, suffer some
sort of post-traumatic stress disorder.37
Anger is easily stirred against those who commit sex crimes. Sex
offenders are not even honored among thieves.38 It is not uncommon for
prisoners to dole out jailhouse justice to those who commit sex crimes,

reality, the likelihood of being attacked by a shark is extremely rare. From 1670 to 2001 there were
only
2,110
reported
shark
attacks
worldwide.
Shark
Attacks,
http://www.sharkattackphotos.com/Images/Misc/attackmap.jpg. See also C.T. Sharp, Letter to the
Editor, C’mon, ST. LOUIS JOURNALISM REV., Dec. 2003-Jan 2004.
In November, KSDK (Channel 5) promoted a story about sex offenders living near
school bus stops as if it had discovered a plague epidemic in St. Louis. I know that
November is sweeps month, but this promo was ridiculous. . . It has to be at the top of
the list of sensationalistic non-stories fabricated by Channel 5.
Id.
36. See Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender
Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 170101, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified as amended as 42
U.S.C. § 14071 (2006); The Jacob Wetterling Disappearance, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR TRIB.,
August 3, 2006, at 1A, available at 2006 WLNR 13423673. See also Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No.
104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (naming a law after Megan Nicole Kanka); L. Steinhamilton,
Megan’s Law Interests Britain, STAR-LEDGER, July 23, 2006, at 29, available at 2006 WLNR
12671260; Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104236, 110 Stat. 3093 (1996) (codified as amended as 42 U.S.C. § 14072 (2006); Jimmy Ryce
Involuntary Civil Commitment for Sexually Violent Predators’ Treatment and Care Act, 1996 Fla.
Laws 338 (1996); David Hancock, Kidnappers Are Seldom Strangers, CBSNEWS.COM, June 19, 2002,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/06/19/national/main512745.shtml); Jessica Lunsford Act, 2005 Fla. Laws 28
(2005); Gary Fineout & Mary Ellen Klas, Dead Kids are Campaign Fodder for Crist, MIAMI
HERALD, Aug. 3, 2006, available at http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/15184792.htm.;
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006);
Roberto Santiago & Wanda J. Demarzo, New Law Marks Adam Walsh Case Anniversary: On the
Anniversary of 6-year-old Adam Walsh’s Abduction, President Bush Today Will Sign an Act
Creating a National Sex Offender Registry, MIAMI HERALD, July 27, 2006, available at
http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/15184792.htm.
37. NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, RAPE-RELATED POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER
(2002),
http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/main.aspx?dbName=DocumentViewer&DocumentAction=ViewProperti
es&DocumentID=32366&UrlToReturn=http%3a%2f%2fwww.ncvc.org%2fncvc%2fmain.aspx%3f
dbName%3dAdvancedSearch.
38. Sex offenders, especially child sex offenders, are treated poorly in prison. See HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, NO ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS pt. IV (2001), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/prison/report4.html#N_222_. Among prisoners, sex offenders are
considered the lowest prisoners of all. Id.
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especially if the crime involved a minor.39 Up until June 2006, in
Illinois, the sex offender classification included those who murder
children.40 A child-murderer’s mother asked for and received a new
separate classification because she did not want her son to be labeled as
a sex offender because of the stigma.41 When abusing a child is
considered worse than murdering a child, there is little doubt the term
“sex offender” brands a deep mark.
Finally, there is a dangerousness myth that surrounds sex
offenders.42 Studies in the 1970s and 1980s that suggested sex offender
recidivism was not affected by treatment led many to the conclusion that
there was nothing that could be done to curb the deviant behavior.43
Couple the misuse of research data with a media that sensationalizes sex
crimes and sex offenders, and it is no wonder the public sentiment
against sex offenders is so high.44
39. See id. (discussing the targeting of prisoners convicted of sexually abusing minors). For
example, one inmate said,
Inmates confined for sexual offenses, especially those against juvenile victims, are at the
bottom of the pecking order and consequentially most often victimized. Because of their
crime, the general population justifies using their weakness by labeling rape ‘just
punishment’ for their crime. Sexual offenders are the number one target group for
prisoner rape.
Id.
40. Sex Offender and Child Murderer Community Notification Law, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT.
152/101 (1996) (amended 2006).
41. Jocelyn Black, Illinois House and Senate Agree to Send ‘Sex Offender Only’ Bill, MEDILL
NEWS
SERVICE,
Apr.
6,
2006,
available
at
http://mesh.medill.northwestern.edu/mnschicago/archives/2006/04/sexoffdb_the_il.html. On June
27, 2006, the governor signed into law the Child Murderer and Violent Offender Against Youth
Registration Act. The Act provides for the registration of persons who were previously registered as
sex offenders under the Sex Offender Registration Act for the offenses of kidnapping, aggravated
kidnapping, unlawful restraint, aggravated unlawful restraint, first degree murder, child abduction,
and forcible detention when those offenses were committed against persons under 18 years of age.
See Child Murder and Violent Offender Against Youth Registration Act, Pub. Act 94-945, 2006 Ill.
Laws 945.
State rep. John Fritchey (D-Chicago) introduced the bill in November 2005. He said that
he was inspired by a woman, whose son would have to register as a sex offender even
though his murder conviction didn’t have anything to do with a sexual crime. “As a
father, I know firsthand how terrifying the words ‘sex offender’ are to a parent and I
have zero tolerance for those individuals,” Rep. Fritchey said in a press release. “But
we’re essentially talking about truth in labeling here. We were attaching a very powerful
and inaccurate stigma to someone whose transgression did not warrant it. He was
essentially facing a second sentence for a crime he did not commit.”
Black, supra.
42. See Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abuse, Facts About Adult Sex Offenders
(2001), http://www.atsa.com/ppOffenderFacts.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
43. Id.
44. See Nora V. Demleitner, First Peoples, First Principles: The Sentencing Commission’s
Obligation to Reject False Images of Criminal Offenders, 87 IOWA L. REV. 563, 569 (2002).
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III. COMPARATIVE RECIDIVISM RATES
Contrary to popular public opinion, the recidivism rate for sex
crimes is no worse than the recidivism rate for other crimes.45 In fact,
sex offense recidivism is extremely low compared to recidivism for
other crimes.46 According to the Department of Justice’s statistics of sex
offender recidivism, 5.3 percent of sex offenders were rearrested for a
sex offense within three years of their release.47 Forty-three percent of
convicted sex offenders were arrested for all crimes during this same
period, but the overwhelming majority of those arrests were for other
non-sexual allegations.48 Also, using arrests as proof of behavior is
misleading because those with a criminal record are often the first ones
blamed for new criminal activity.
While a 24 percent recidivism rate49 might sound high, using it as a
call to arms when most other crimes have a similar propensity or worse
is fallacious. For example, 67 percent of drug convicts are rearrested
within three years with a conviction rate of 47 percent,50 yet there is no
restriction keeping drug offenders from living or working near schools.
While most states have laws that enhance a drug crime if it takes place
within a certain distance from a school, there is nothing to prevent drug
offenders from living there after they are released.51 Thus, sex offender
employment and residence restrictions are either precursors of what is to
come to all criminal offenders or a special sanction for only the sex
offender.
45. See IOWA DEP’T OF HUM. RIGHTS, DIV. OF CRIM. & JUV. JUSTICE PLANNING &
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS CTR., IOWA SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY AND RECIDIVISM (2000); PATRICK
A. LANGAN, ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM
PRISON IN 1994 14, (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf. “The
43% re-arrest rate of the 9,691 released sex offenders was low by comparison.” Id.
46. See PATRICK A. LANGAM & DAVID J. LEVIN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF
PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994 (2002).
47. Id. at 1.
48. Id. at 2, 14.
49. Id. at 14 (“the reconviction rate for . . . 9,691 released sex offenders was 24.0%. . . .”).
50. Id.
51. See, e g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6314(b)(3-4) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Reg.
Sess.).
In addition to the mandatory minimum sentence set forth in subsection (a), the person
shall be sentenced to an additional minimum sentence of at least two years total
confinement, notwithstanding any other provision of this title or other statute to the
contrary, if the person did any of the following: . . . 3) Committed the offense within
1,000 feet of the real property on which is located a public, private or parochial school or
a college or university. (4) Committed the offense on a school bus or within 500 feet of a
school bus stop.
Id.
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Data can be used to mislead. As often stated, there are “lies, damn
lies – and statistics.”52 The data collected for sex offender recidivism
could fit into all three categories. The Department of Justice is guilty of
misleading the public with non-informative information.
In its
introduction and highlights section the report lists that “sex offenders are
four times more likely to be arrested for a new sex crime” than non-sex
offenders.53 Statistics make this true because only 1.3 percent of the
non-sex offenders committed sex crimes.54 Looking at the raw numbers,
the actual incidences of sexual recidivism is much greater for the nonsex offenders than the sex offenders.55 So, with all the focus on the
convicted sex offenders, we miss approximately 86.5 percent of the new
sex crimes.56
IV. RESTRICTIONS
With the belief that proximity leads to promiscuity, twenty-four
states, including California, which recently joined the fray, currently
have some form of residence and/or employment restrictions for
convicted sex offenders.57 These restrictions may last for only the
designated period of supervised release or apply for the remainder of an
offender’s life.58 Nineteen states have residence and/or employment
restrictions that apply beyond the period of any probation or parole
period.59 In some states these restrictions are permanent, with no
process or ability to remove the burden.60 These restrictions have
disastrous effects on convicted sex offenders who are trying to be decent
52. Quote . . . Unquote, The Most Quoted Remarks, http://www1c.btwebworld.com/quoteunquote/p0000149.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2006) (quoting MARK TWAIN, AUTOBIOGRAPHY
(1924)). Twain gives credit for the quote to Disraeli. Id.
53. LANGAM ET AL., supra note 45, at 1.
54. Id. A percent of 5.3 is four times more than 1.3 percent, but neither is very high. Id.
55. Id. Five hundred-seventeen of 9,691 sex offenders were rearrested for a new sex crime
within three years compared to 3,328 out of 262,420 non-sex offenders. Id.
56. Id. Of the 3,845 new sex crime arrests, 3,328 were from non-sex offenders. Id.
57. CAL. PENAL CODE § 209 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.) (codifying California
Ballot Initiative Proposition 83, available at http://ca.lwv.org/lwvc/edfund/elections/2006nov/
id/prop83.html).
58. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20-33(a) (Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.) (setting the
restrictive period at life); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8310(1) (2006) (setting the restrictive period at 10
years).
59. See supra note 14.
60. For example, Iowa has no means for a sex offender subject to residence and employment
restrictions to ever have those restrictions lifted. IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.2A (West 2006). See
Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 709 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538
U.S. 1, 7-8 (2003)) (“[T]here is no requirement that the State provide a process to establish an
exemption from a legislative classification.”).
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members of the community. Often they are forced to quit their jobs and
By having these restrictions, a state’s public policy
move.61
demonstrates a preference for sex offenders to be unemployed and living
in an “RV in old K-Mart parking lot” or in a “truck near the river” or
“under the 7th street bridge.”62 With these laws, sex offenders are
forced to live nomadic lives.
It is not uncommon to have laws that prevent activities from taking
place within a certain distance of a school, church, or residential area.63
What is unique about these restrictions is the lack of any criminal desire
required.64 These zoning restrictions do not involve a crime, as in the
case with selling or possessing drugs or guns near schools.65 In this
case, the mere physical presence of a former sex offender is the offense.
The thrust of the injustice in these laws is against those who have
completed their sentence and are not released as parolees or
probationers. It is these individuals who are ready to start their lives
over; but with these residence and employment restrictions hanging over
their heads, they will have a difficult time assimilating.
A. Residence
Nineteen states66 and many other local communities have enacted
residence restrictions on former sex offenders, prohibiting them from
living a certain distance away from schools,67 child-care facilities,68
public swimming pools,69 public playgrounds,70 churches, or any area
61. See Jill S. Levenson & Leo P. Cotter, The Impact of Sex Offender Residence Restrictions:
1,000 Feet From Danger or One Step From Absurd? 49 INT’L J. OF OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP.
CRIMINOLOGY 168 (2005).
62. These are actual responses by individuals forced to move and list their new address with
their sex offender treatment providers in Iowa. See Kansas Dep’t of Corrections, Twenty Findings
of Research on Residential Restrictions for Sex Offenders and the Iowa Experience with Similar
Policies,
http://www.dc.state.ks.us/SOHR/Twenty_Findings_on_Restrictions_for_Sex_Offenders.htm (last
visited March 7, 2007).
63. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 790.115(1) (2006) (prohibiting a firearm or weapon within 1,000
feet of a school); Id. § 790.115(2)(b) (prohibiting the possession of an electric weapon or device,
destructive device, or other weapon on school property); Id. § 790.115(2)(c) (prohibiting the
possession a firearm on school property).
64. § 790.115.
65. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:11-5 (West 2006) (stating that death by vehicular
manslaughter is worse if the perpetrator was intoxicated and the victim was on school grounds).
66. See infra Table 1.
67. See e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(a) (Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.).
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1(A)(2) (2006).
70. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.545(1) (West 2006).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007

13

Akron Law Review, Vol. 40 [2007], Iss. 2, Art. 4
LESTERFINAL.DOC

352

3/30/2007 1:54:06 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[40:339

where minors congregate, such as parks, arcades, and even school bus
stops.71 Restrictions from living 500, 1,000, 1,500 or 2,000 feet from the
above mentioned areas seems like a quick and simple fix to the
perceived recidivism problem. However, this final solution actually
solves nothing while presenting a host of new problems, the least of
which is a violation of the individual’s constitutional rights.
The residence restrictions are typically from property line to
property line and not door-to-door, so the prohibited area is often larger
than one might expect.72 Communities that have restrictions of 2,000
feet essentially block out all of the urban areas as the overlapping
bubbles leave few, if any, reasonable places to reside.73 A quick look at
an urban area map will demonstrate how such restrictions severely limit
housing options for sex offenders.74 The purpose, it seems, is to drive
sex offenders out of the community. Some legislators are even so
brazen as to admit such intent.75 Whether or not banishment is the
purpose, it is the result.
Among the states that have residence restrictions, there is some
discrepancy in determining which sex offenders qualify for residence
restrictions. In Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Tennessee, the residence restrictions are
registration driven.76 In other words, all individuals who have to register
as sex offenders are subject to residence restrictions.77 In Alabama,
Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, and Ohio, the residence restrictions are offense
driven, so the application is not as facially broad, but it is still
significant.78 In Louisiana, the residence restrictions apply only to those
71. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (2006). See also infra Table 1.
72. In Georgia, the distance is measured from the property boundary of the sex offender’s
residence to the property boundary of the child care facility, school, or area where minors
congregate, at their closest points. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(a) (2006). But in Kentucky, the
measurement is taken in a straight line from the nearest wall of the school to the nearest wall of the
registrant’s place of residence. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.545.
73. By reasonable, I mean an affordable, safe living space. It is not reasonable to say that an
individual has a theoretical option to move to a certain neighborhood when the cost of living space
far exceeds the individual’s financial means. Likewise, it is not reasonable to force people to move
into a “high crime area.”
74. See infra app. 1.
75. See e.g., Complaint, supra note 9, ¶ 56.
76. See infra Table 1.
77. In Arkansas, being subject to registration is just the first part of the analysis. A registrant
will also have to be declared dangerous with a score of three or four on a four point scale. ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(a) (2006).
78. See infra Table 1. It would be possible for a person to be classified as a sex offender for
registration purposes but not subject to residence or employment restrictions—like in Arkansas and
Louisiana. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(a); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1(A)(2) (2006). While
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classified as sexually violent predators.79 Arizona, California, Florida,
Oregon, and Texas have residence restrictions only as part of probation
or parole or some other form of supervised release.80 Indiana has
enacted a more broadly applicable restriction, but the previous law
regarding parolees remains in effect.81
Washington and Nebraska are unique in that there is no overarching
state mandate for residence and employment restrictions with the actual
decision on restrictions left up to the local communities. The state does
provide some guidance and limitations as to how far the communities
can go.82 Washington imposed a residence restriction on sex offenders
as a condition of community custody.83 The offender could not reside
within 880 feet from the facilities or grounds of a public or private
school.84 In 2006, Washington established a committee to develop
statewide standards for cities and towns to use when determining
whether to impose residency restrictions on sex offenders.85 Nebraska
defers to and provides guidance for local communities that enact
residency restrictions.86 State legislation signed into law on April 13,
2006, allows cities to prohibit a high-risk sex offender whose victim was
18 years of age or younger from living within 500 feet of a school or
child care facility.87
States that do not have a formal statewide restriction may have
local ordinances that vary in degree from town to town.88 Logistically,
communities, if left to their own devices, often take harsher stances
against sex offenders to ensure that there is little or no available housing
since the effect of not having such prohibitions will be felt in a smaller
this is a variation in classification it can have the same effect if all the enumerated offenses that
subject one to registration are also the same that apply to the residence and employment
restrictions—like in Alabama where all those that have to register are subject to the residence
requirements. ALA. CODE §§ 15-20-26(a), 15-20-21(1) (Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.).
79. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1(A).
80. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1604.07(F) (LexisNexis 2006), CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003(g)
(West, Westlaw through Ch. 910 of 2006 Reg. Sess.), FLA. STAT. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (2006); OR.
REV. STAT. § 144.642(1)(a) (2006); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12(13B) (Vernon 2006).
81. IND. CODE ANN. § 11-13-3-4(g)(2)(B) (West 2006).
82. See S.B. 6325, 59th 2d Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005).
83. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.712(6)(a)(ii) (2006).
84. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(8) (2006). This provision expired July 1, 2006. Id.
85. See S.B. 6325.
86. See, e.g., Legis. B. 1199, 99th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2005).
87. See id. §§ 27-29.
88. See, e.g., Pamela A. MacLean, Suit Tests Power of Sex Offender Bans, Six Cities Want to
Copy Law; They Wait For Result, 28 NAT’L L.J. 6, Oct. 3, 2005, at col. 2; Associated Press, Cuero
Wants to Require Sex Offenders to Post Yard Signs, KLTV, Jan. 6, 2006, available at
http://kltv.com/global/story.asp?s=4247289&ClientType=Printable.
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community. In such cases where only local ordinances exist, notice can
be a problem.89
B. Employment
Along with residence restrictions, several states and local
communities have also enacted employment restrictions intended to keep
sex offenders away from schools, daycare facilities, playgrounds, public
swimming pools, video arcades, recreation centers, or public athletic
fields and the like.90 Similar to the residence restrictions, this is
employment zoning. Not only are sex offenders prohibited from
working at these locations, but they are also prohibited from working
near these locations.91 Because most sex offenses against children are
committed by individuals who have a prior relationship with their
victims, there is a rational basis for keeping child offenders out of
relationship-building type jobs such as a teacher or counselor at a
school.92 But when the law places a barrier around schools and
playgrounds that blocks off large sections of the community, the impact
of this restriction for employment purposes is enormous and
unnecessary.
Jobs that require workers to work at new locations on a regular
basis such as plumbers, electricians, and construction are now off-limits
to convicted sex offenders because of the risk of inadvertently entering
the restricted zones. Downtown areas will be off-limits to prior
offenders who are attorneys or accountants or who hold other whitecollar jobs. With just one daycare facility located on one floor of a highrise building, an entire city block could be off-limits. For all practical
purposes, sex offenders will be relegated to agricultural work on the
outskirts of the community. If that is not feasible, then unemployment is
the natural consequence of these restrictions.
As a matter of public policy, it is strange to prefer idleness over
work. While unemployment is not the stated objective of these
restrictions, it is often the result. Being productive is a key component

89. WOI-TV, Sex Offender’s Wife Worries About Family Future, Nov. 23, 2005, available at
http://www.woi-tv.com/Global/story.asp?S=4056859&nav=1LFX. “The Story County attorney
says his county first started drawing up maps about a month ago. Since then, they’ve changed it
about twenty times. As of Monday, their map still isn’t finalized. That leaves sex offenders who
know they need to move, not knowing where they can go.” Id.
90. See infra Table 3.
91. See infra Table 3.
92. CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT SEX
OFFENDERS (2000).
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to successful rehabilitation and in preventing recidivism.93 Employment
plays a significant role in an individual’s feeling of self-worth.94 Taking
away a person’s ability to work attacks that person’s dignity. With no
documented proof that working in proximity to children increases sex
crimes, it is odd that courts have done nothing to stop governments from
interfering with the essential right to earn a living. Unencumbered
without a home or a job, a convicted sex offender is more at risk to reoffend.95 After all, what else has he got to do?
C. Not Banishment?
The impetus for these not-in-my-backyard ordinances and laws is
the perceived need to keep children away from sex offenders. After all,
would any person, if given the choice, want a sex offender living next
door? Once one community sets up such a law driving the sex offenders
out of its community, it forces the neighboring community to act in kind
to avoid becoming a haven for sex offenders.96 When a community or
state adopts a 1,000-foot rule or greater, that community is effectively
removing that individual from its community by its strategic zoning. By
looking at a map with the 1,000-foot radius drawn around every school,
few areas remain where sex offenders may live.97 When daycare
facilities, including residential homes that serve as day care facilities are
added in, the possible living area is even smaller. For states like
Georgia, which also add in places where children might congregate, all
school bus stops, and churches, then the map is completely covered.98
Banishment, not protection, is the desired goal of these laws.99
Georgia House Majority leader Jerry Keen, the chief sponsor of 2006
Georgia House Bill 1059, stated,
We want those people running away from Georgia. Given the toughest
laws here, we think a lot of people could move to another state. If it
becomes too onerous and too inconvenient, they just may want to live
93. CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TIME TO WORK: MANAGING
(2002).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Mike Carlson, Not In My City, ORLANDO WEEKLY, Aug. 25, 2005, available at
http://www.orlandoweekly.com/util/printready.asp?id=8250.
97. See infra app. 1.
98. GA. CODE ANN § 42-1-15 (2006).
99. Jason Garcia, Legislator Seeks Statewide Predator Law, SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 15, 2005, at
12B (quoting Rep. Susan Goldstein who introduced a bill in the Florida legislature to increase the
residence restrictions from 1000 feet to 2500 and whose ultimate goal was to “get these people out
of our neighborhoods and hopefully out of our state”).
THE EMPLOYMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS UNDER COMMUNITY SUPERVISION

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007

17

Akron Law Review, Vol. 40 [2007], Iss. 2, Art. 4
LESTERFINAL.DOC

356

3/30/2007 1:54:06 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

somewhere else.
Georgia.100

[40:339

And I don’t care where, as long as it’s not

The effect of this law in Georgia would be to send sex offenders
scrambling to find housing and employment, regardless of how long
they have lived in their current residence. That is the intent. Rep. Keen
echoed his sentiments in the house chambers when he said,
If someone did something now to my grandchildren, I think you and I
would have the same reaction to that. Those are the people we’re
targeting. Those are the people we are trying to get off the streets of
this state, and those are the people that we are going to send a message
to that if you have a propensity to that crime perhaps you need to move
to another state.101

If the law stands, Rep. Keen would get his wish. In Forsyth
County, Georgia, 64 of 68 registered sex offenders would have to
move—most likely out of the county.102 But the situation is even worse
in neighboring counties. For instance, in DeKalb County, Georgia, a
suburb of Atlanta, 466 of the 466 registered sex offenders would have to
move.103 Pushed out of the urban areas, those affected are forced into
the country or out of the state.
The real impetus of these bills is not on protecting children, but on
punishing former sex offenders once again.104 In response to criticism of
the residence restrictions in Kentucky, Kenton County Sheriff Chuck
Korzenborn stated, “I don’t care how inconvenient we make it for these
guys. . . . Don’t commit the crime and you won’t have to do the time.”105
These zoning laws are so onerous to comply with that it is just a matter

100. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶ 56.
101. See Statement by Representative Keen to Representative Roger Bruce during House
Debate on H.B. 1059, Feb. 2, 2006, House Internet Broadcasts, available at
http://www.georgia.gov/00/article/0,2086,4802_6107103_47120020,00.html. See also Georgia’s
New Sex Offender Law Nixed, GWINNETT DAILY ONLINE, July 3, 2006, available at
http://www.gwinnettdailyonline.com/GDP/archive/article19EE2C8F45E54F0C972E0BAE97E39C8
6.asp (quoting Representative Keen’s remarks that the law would be an “inconvenience,” but urging
that “most folks would agree this is a good thing”).
102. Doug Nurse, Registered Sex Offenders, ATLANTA J. CONST., July 6, 2006, at 1JH,
available at 2006 WLNR 11637530.
103. Id. Other metro Atlanta counties would have similar totals: Cherokee County 90 of 95;
Clayton County 190 of 220; Cobb County 204 of 208; Henry County 100 of 108; and Rockdale 29
of 29. Id.
104. Joyce Blay, Police Waiting for Maps to Enforce Residency Law: Jackson, Lakewood
Officials have Targeted Convicted Sex Offenders, TRI-TOWN NEWS, Sept. 22, 2005, available at
http://tritown.gmnews.com/news/2005/0922/Front_page/032.html.
105. William Croyle, Sex Offenders Put on Notice: Move if You’re near a School, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, June 25, 2006, at 1A.
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of time before innocent people are locked up. Take the situation in the
New Jersey townships of Jackson and Lakewood, where, four months
after adopting sex offender residency ordinances, the townships still had
not produced maps showing the “pedophile-free zones.”106 “There will
be a map generated, not so someone can say, ‘Oh, that’s not where I can
live,’” said a Jackson police captain.107 “It’s not a question of them
knowing, but so we can know. If we want to charge them with the
ordinance, we need the map.”108
If the real purpose was protection, then states that have adopted
these programs would offer proof that this community purging actually
does protect the community and its children. In fact, the states that have
actually given thoughtful consideration to this proposal before voting on
it have found that there is no correlation between residency and
employment locale and recidivism. Both Colorado and Minnesota did
extensive research on the issue and found that, if anything, this forced
exile only exacerbates the problem it purports to solve.109
This forced migration of a select group of former criminals is
unprecedented. There were forced migrations of Indian Tribes in the
1830s110 and of Japanese-Americans in the 1940s.111 There have been
times when suspect groups of people, such as foreign agents,
Communists, and aliens were subject to monitoring and regulation.112 It
is rare for a law to force one class of individuals away from the general
106.
107.
108.
109.

Blay, supra note 104.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
See SEX OFFENDER MGMT BD., COLORADO DEP’T OF PUBLIC SAFETY, REPORT ON
SAFETY ISSUES RAISED BY LIVING ARRANGEMENTS FOR AND LOCATIONS OF SEX OFFENDERS IN
THE COMMUNITY (2004) (finding no correlation between where sex offenders lived in comparison
to where other criminals lived therefore, a residence restriction would not be a productive method to
control
recidivism)
available
at
http://dcj.state.co.us/odvsom/Sex_Offender/SO_Pdfs/FullSLAFinal01.pdf; MINNESOTA DEP’T OF
CORRECTIONS, LEVEL THREE SEX OFFENDERS RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT ISSUES (2003) (finding
that the residence restrictions would force the state to provide housing for those displaced by such
an act and that the cost of creating new housing would be too high along with a belief that
residential restrictions would not enhance community safety)
available at
http://www.corr.state.mn.us/publications/legislativereports/pdf/2004/Lvl%203%20SEX%20OFFEN
DERS%20report%202003%20(revised%202-04).pdf.
110. Pursuant to the Indian Removal Act. See About North Georgia, The Trail of Tears,
http://ngeorgia.com/history/nghisttt.html (last visited March 8, 2007).
111. Act of March 21, 1942, ch. 191, 56 Stat. 173 (providing a penalty for violation of
Executive Order 9066, which authorized the Secretary of War to prescribe military areas). See also
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
112. Michele L. Earl-Hubbard, The Child Sex Offender Registration Laws: The Punishment,
Liberty Depravation, and Unintended Results Associated with the Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990s,
90 NW. U. L REV. 788, 815 n.183 (1996).
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population as if they were contagious.113 It is outrageous for any court
to mischaracterize laws that require citizens living in a law-abiding
manner to quit their jobs and uproot their families, taking them out of
their chosen communities and forcing them into underdeveloped areas
by not calling it what it is—banishment.
V. PENALTIES FOR BEING IN THE ZONE
Violations of the residence or employment restrictions are much
more than just a slap on the wrist. For most states the first violation is a
felony.114 In Alabama and Georgia, it is a severe felony with up to 30
years for one violation.115 In many cases a violation of this prohibition
is punished with greater severity than the crime that made the person a
sexual offender to begin with.116
Interestingly, for the most part there is no mens rea required to
violate these restrictions.117 A sexual offender may be strictly liable for
complying with these prohibitions.118 The basic problem with this is the
fact that the prohibited areas are growing constantly. An individual may
live or work outside a protected zone only to have a daycare facility pop
up near the sex offender. In such a case, the sex offender would have
little recourse and no knowledge of such an event.
What is really going on is that these regulations are a way to punish
sex offenders twice for one criminal act. Feeling unsatisfied and
impotent, states and local communities set legal traps for the convicted
sex offenders to fall into so that they can incarcerate them again. It is
just a matter of time before a sex offender who tries to remain in a
community will violate these specially crafted restrictions.
VI. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
There are unintended consequences of the residence and
employment restrictions that may actually exacerbate the problem that
113. In an effort to curb prostitution, Richmond, Virginia, city officials want to make parts of
the city off limits to particular individuals unless they lived, worked, or worshipped in the area. Jim
Nolan, Zones Would Bar Prostitutes, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept.11, 2006, at B-1.
114. See infra Table 2. (listing Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, and
Tennessee as the states where the first violation of a restriction is a felony).
115. See infra Table 2 (listing that in Alabama, punishment ranges from 1 to 10 years
imprisonment; in Georgia, from 10 to 30 years imprisonment).
116. See infra Table 2.
117. See infra Table 2.
118. Offenders are strictly liable in Iowa, Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan,
Missouri, Ohio, and South Dakota. See infra Table 2.
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the laws were intended to correct. Because these laws are often passed
without much consideration as to the results of implementation, there
have been many negatives consequences. The shortsightedness of these
laws is that, in their zeal to protect, they give sex offenders little hope of
redemption.
We express a desire for rehabilitation of the individual, while
simultaneously we do everything to prevent it. . . . We tell him to
return to the norm of behavior, yet we brand him as virtually
unemployable; he is required to live with his normal activities severely
restricted and we react with sickened wonder and disgust when he
returns to a life of crime.119

Coupled with the fact that these restrictions will not work, the negatives
far exceed the positives. That is why the Iowa County Attorney’s
Association has publicly called for the overturning of Iowa’s 2,000 foot
residence restriction.120
By pushing sex offenders away from society, these laws can isolate
sex offenders from their friends, co-workers, and other support systems.
Without support, the sex offender is left to fend off any deviant urges on
his or her own. Without employment, a sex offender will face idle time,
which is a factor in favor of recidivism.121 Social science research
indicates that “[d]uring the past 20 years, research on recidivism of the
general criminal population identified a history of unstable employment
as one of the factors that consistently is associated with criminal
behavior.”122 As Kathleen Colebank, a supervisor for Kentucky’s sex
offender treatment program states, “With many of the people we treat,
isolation played a role in them committing the offense, and we risk
replicating that.”123
In areas where residence restrictions exist, there are limited choices
for housing for those classified as sex offenders. As a result, the
likelihood exists that sex offenders will be concentrated in certain areas
of town or certain areas just outside of town, if they can find any
reasonable housing at all.124 The market value of a neighborhood full of
119. Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942, 953 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc) (Lay, J., dissenting).
120. IOWA COUNTY ATTORNEYS ASS’N, STATEMENT ON SEX OFFENDER RESIDENCY
RESTRICTIONS
IN
IOWA,
Feb.14,
2006,
available
at
http://www.iowaicaa.com/ICAA%20STATEMENTS/Sex%20Offender%20Residency%20Statement%20Feb%2014
%2006%20for%20website.pdf.
121. CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 93, at 1-2.
122. Id. (citing Paul Gendreau, et al., A Meta-Analysis of the Predictors of Adult Criminal
Recidivism: What Works, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 575 (1996)).
123. Croyle, supra note 105.
124. See, e.g., Map of Webster City, Iowa, infra app. 1.
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registered sex offenders would most likely be depressed, much like an
area of town deemed to be a “high crime area.”125 Communities would
then react against any concentration of sex offenders. For example, the
small town of Ely, Iowa, a town without a single school or daycare
center, passed local ordinances banning sex offenders from living near
the city park, playground, or library, which effectively eliminated all
residential areas in the town.126 “We felt a little vulnerable,” said an Ely
resident.127 “For a lot of towns like ours, we can become the only place
available for sex offenders.”128 Fear, then, is the driving force.
Residence restrictions leave many offenders homeless.129 The
coverage area is so large, especially in 2,000-feet areas, that there is
limited housing available.130 In states or communities where multiple
difficult-to-identify triggers exist, such as daycare facilities, school bus
stops or places where children congregate, even a smaller prohibited
area severely limits reasonable housing. Much of the permissible
property is located in high-rent districts or in rural areas where housing
is limited.131
The homeless problem creates an enforcement problem. Although
offenders are required to provide a valid address when they register, it is
not uncommon for an offender to have to move to comply with the
residence law. Subsequent reporting is poor.132 In Iowa, for example,
the number of missing sex offenders has more than doubled since the
residence restrictions went into effect in September 2005.133 Keeping up
with the migration of sex offenders will be a full-time job for law
enforcement.134 Most do not have the money or the manpower to devote
so much time to herding people out of town. Other states are losing
track of their registered sex offenders, as well. Sex offenders simply do
not bother to register anymore because it will only lead to an immediate
arrest. In North Carolina, sex offenders are now missing in record
125. See, e.g., MINNESOTA DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 109, at 11.
126. Todd Dvorak, Iowa Towns Rush to Bar Sex Offenders, BOSTON GLOBE, November 12,
2005,
available
at
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2005/11/12/
iowa_towns_rush_to_bar_sex_offenders/.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Rood, supra note 6.
130. See, e.g., MINNESOTA DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 109, at 11.
131. Id.
132. Rood, supra note 6.
133. Id.
134. See Stephen Gurr, Forsyth Sheriff Paxton Testifies in Federal Hearing. FORSYTH COUNTY
NEWS, July 12, 2006 (quoting Charlene Giles, an investigator for the Houston County (Georgia)
Sheriff’s Office, “It’s going to be a never-ending job, never-ending”).
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numbers.135
Another unintended consequence would be the desire to create
illegitimate sanctuaries. Local communities would actively increase the
number of protected areas by increasing the number of public parks or
lowering standards for residential daycare facilities. In some states, it is
fairly easy to have one’s home considered a child-care facility, which
would entitle it to the protection zone. In Iowa, for instance, as the
number of day care facilities increases, it becomes more and more
difficult to know what locations are off-limits.136 While there is nothing
inherently wrong with having a surplus of daycare facilities, the
classification of many would be disingenuous. Similarly, in states that
include school bus stops as a prohibited area, there would be impetus for
communities to artificially designate areas to zone off more of the
community.137
Another enforcement problem is created by treating all sex
offenders the same regardless of the nature of their offense. By treating
all sex offenders the same, the number of individuals classified as a sex
offender becomes too large to effectively manage. The number of sex
offenders will grow at a pace much faster than the authorities can
handle. Special units will need to be created that focus on the
monitoring of sex offenders. State and local governments, already
strapped for funds, are not equipped to handle all the work required by
these restrictive ordinances.
These restrictions displace not only individuals, but also their
families.138 The impact of relocating is not just felt by the offender
because the whole family unit must move. A family may have to find
new friends, attend new schools, and find new places to worship. Some
135. Fred Kelly & Franco Ordoñez, Gaps in Sex-Offender Tracking, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER,
Jun. 11, 2006, 1A (“Authorities have lost track of at least 22 convicted sex offenders in
Mecklenburg County and hundreds more across the Carolinas.”).
136. According to the Iowa Department of Human Resources between 2002 and 2003, the first
year of the residence restrictions, there were 1,921 new listings on the list of 7,172 facilities
statewide. Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 849 (S.D. Iowa 2004), rev’d, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir.
2005). See also WOI-TV, supra note 89.
137. Press Release, Southern Center for Human Rights, Enforcement of Bus Stop Rule Halted
in Bulloch County (Aug. 15, 2006) (stating that the consent order agreed to after Bulloch County
Georgia school boards designated 1,700 school bus stops in Bulloch county), available at
http://www.schr.org/aboutthecenter/pressreleases/HB1059_litigation/PressReleases/press_lawsuitH
B1059_BullochConsent.htm.
138. Georgia School Districts Embroiled in Enforcement of Sex Offender Law, National
School
Boards
Association,
Legal
Clips,
Aug.
2006,
available
at
http://www.nsba.org/site/doc_cosa.asp?TRACKID=&VID=50&CID=482&DID=38984
[hereinafter Georgia School Districts] (40 families will be displaced once the Columbia County,
Georgia, establishes where bus stops are officially located).
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families are faced with a difficult decision; because of the reduction in
the quality of life in staying together, some may choose to remain
without the offending family member.
Finally, by establishing these residence and employment
restrictions, a community is merely passing its perceived problem on to
the next town.139 One by one, communities are adopting laws—not to
handle a perceived current problem with local sex offenders—but as a
defense mechanism to prevent displaced offenders from other areas from
settling in their community.140 In Orange Beach Alabama, residents not
satisfied with the Alabama’s 2000 foot restriction passed an ordinance
that increases the prohibited zones to four miles.141 As community after
community forbids offenders from residing in their midst, sex offenders
are left to wander the earth in search of acceptance.
VII. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THESE RESTRICTIONS
With the U.S. Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Doe v. Miller,
the Court currently tacitly permits residence and employment
restrictions.142 The key aspect in determining the constitutionality of
these restrictions lies in whether the Court views these restrictions as
civil or criminal. The Court in Smith v. Doe upheld the sex offender
registrations as civil and regulatory because they did not prohibit the sex
offender from doing anything; rather, the regulations merely required
sex offenders to do something that is not uncommon.143 Under the
Alaska statutory scheme, sex offenders just had to register themselves,
much like any other person would register a motor vehicle.144 If a
vehicle is moved from one jurisdiction to another, the owner is required
to update that registration. Having to register as a sex offender does not
prevent a sex offender from moving.145 Surprisingly, most courts that
have had an opportunity to weigh in on this issue have upheld residence
and employment restrictions as constitutional.146 The U.S. Supreme
139. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 96.
140. Id.
141. Ryan Dezember, City Tightens Sex Abuser Restrictions, MOBILE REG., Sept. 8, 2005, at 3.
142. Doe v. Miller, 126 S.Ct. 757 (2005), denying cert. to 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005).
143. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 96, 106 (2003) (holding Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration
Act was not unconstitutional and not violative of the ex post facto clause).
144. Id. at 96.
145. Sex offenders often cannot move without first obtaining permission from both the local
law enforcement and the proposed new law enforcement. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 775.21(6)(i-j)
(2006).
146. See, e.g., Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005); Denson v. Georgia, 600 S.E.2d 645
(Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (holding residence restrictions were not unconstitutional ex post facto law as
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Court has not fully examined the constitutionality of residence and
employment restrictions but does suggest that there are limits to the
restrictions placed on sex offenders who have served their time.147
A. Ex Post Facto Laws
In general, ex post facto laws are laws passed after a particular
event has occurred to make the previous activity illegal.148 A prohibition
against ex post facto laws is found in the United States Constitution149
and serves as a foundational principle for our ordered scheme of
liberty.150 The United States Constitution also prohibits states from
enacting such laws.151 Ex post facto laws are often considered void.152
In its first Ex Post Facto Clause case, the Supreme Court described
four ways a legislature could run afoul of it.153 Justice Chase wrote:
1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of
the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and
punishes such action. 2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, or
makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3rd. Every law
that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment,
than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every
law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or
different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender. All
these, and similar laws, are manifestly unjust and oppressive.154
“[B]ut the restriction not to pass any ex post facto law, was to
secure the person of the subject from injury, or punishment, in
consequence of such law.”155
For a law to be ex post facto, it must also “disadvantage the

applied to plaintiff); Illinois v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. App. 5th Dist. 2005) (holding residence
restriction not unconstitutional); Iowa v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655 (Iowa 2005).
147. Smith, 538 U.S. at 100.
148. See, e.g., id. at 92; Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 439-40 (1997); Weaver v. Graham,
450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981); Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937); Rooney v. North
Dakota, 196 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1905); In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 171 (1890); Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. 386, 390, (1798). See also Logan, supra note 5.
149. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
150. See Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000).
151. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
152. See generally 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 584 (2006).
153. Calder, 3 U.S. at 390.
154. Id. at 390-91.
155. Id. at 390.
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offender affected by it.”156 There is no requirement that it hinder any
particular right. In fact, “[it] need not impair a ‘vested right’ . . . . Even
if a statute merely alters penal provisions accorded by the grace of the
legislature, it violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it is both retrospective
and more onerous than the law in effect on the date of the offense.”157
For example, a change in state law that altered how “good time credit”
was calculated for inmates was an ex post facto violation even though
there is no constitutional right to “good time credit.”158
Determining if a statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause hinges on
the purpose of the law.159 If the legislature meant to impose punishment,
then the statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it punishes previous
activity.160 If the intention was to establish “civil proceedings” by
enacting a regulatory scheme that is civil and non-punitive, then the
court must look at the effect of the law.161
The first step in the analysis is to ascertain the legislative intent.162
Courts give the legislature the benefit of the doubt in determining intent,
especially if there is an explicitly stated intent within the statute.163 A
high standard of proof is required to overcome even a superficial
statement of intent.164 The U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed in Smith,
“only the clearest proof will suffice to override that intent and transform
what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.”165
Various courts have taken great pains to find a civil intent. For instance,
the placement and naming of an act is given more weight if it claims to
be civil and is found in the civil code.166 The lack of any identification
or its placement in the criminal code is often treated as having little
probative value.167 Regardless of the label or placement of a restriction,
the inquiry does not end at this point.
In examining the legislative intent, it is important to see the lengths
156. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981) (citing Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397,
401 (1937)).
157. Id. at 29-31.
158. See id.
159. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003).
160. Id.; Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997). If the statute’s intent is to punish,
then the Ex Post Facto Clause will be violated if the now unlawful act occurred prior to the adoption
of the law. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 92.
161. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.
162. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. See also United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980).
166. Ward, 448 U.S. at 249.
167. Smith, 538 U.S. at 94-95.
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the legislature went in analyzing the alleged problem. The courts must
be sensitive to the fact that there may not be legitimate debate and
discussion on sex offender restrictions because of the lack of real
representation by the effected class: convicted sex offenders.168 The few
states that have taken the time to see if residence or employment
restrictions would actually work did not enact such provisions.169 Most
legislative bodies act in haste with one goal in mind: removing sex
offenders from the community.170 The Supreme Court has said that the
“failure to consider, or to use, ‘alternative and less harsh methods’ to
achieve a non-punitive objective can help to show that legislature’s
‘purpose was to punish.’”171
Next a court must look at the practical effects of the restrictions and
decide if these restrictions are regulatory or punitive.172 A hardship
placed on an individual is not enough to make a restriction punitive. For
instance, just because a restriction might cause the community to distrust
a sex offender, it will not be punitive unless it encourages an act of
retribution against the sex offender.173 As a result, sex offender
registrations are not considered punitive,174 nor is civil commitment for
sexually violent predators.175
The Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez set forth seven factors
to assist in determining if a statute’s restrictions constitute actual
punishment.176 These factors are not exhaustive but are helpful.177 The
court will balance the factors, which at times contradict each other.
They include: whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or
restraint; whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment;
whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; whether its
operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment: retribution
168. There is a disenfranchisement issue that should provide courts with a reason to view
skeptically any facial designation of civil as opposed to criminal.
169. Colorado and Minnesota both passed on the issue after extensive studies. See supra note
109 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., Georgia School Districts, supra note 138 (quoting school superintendent
Tommy Price, who stated, “Our board didn’t give a lot of thought one way or the other . . . We saw
no reason why we shouldn’t formally approve them.”).
171. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 388 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20 (1979)).
172. See Hawker v. People of New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196 (1898). A court will look at the
substance of the law and not at its form in determining whether it is ex post facto. Id.
173. See Patterson v. State, 985 P.2d 1007, 1013 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999), overruled on other
grounds by Doe v. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 92 P.3d 398 (Alaska 2004).
174. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003).
175. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369.
176. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
177. Smith, 538 U.S. at 97.
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and deterrence; whether the behavior to which it applies is already a
crime; whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it; and whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned.178
The civil/criminal analysis under Mendoza-Martinez tends to be
result oriented. Because there is no true test or measuring stick to
distinguish the two, courts seem to weigh the factors according to the
preferred outcome. How else could the court construe confinement for
those considered dangerous to be civil and not criminal, preventive and
not punitive, when the result of the restraints are exactly the same?179
As residence and employment restrictions proliferate, courts should
eventually reach the point at which these restrictions are considered
punitive and not regulatory.180
There are several important factual differences that distinguish
residence and employment restrictions from the two previous sanctions
which were deemed regulatory: sex offender registration and civil
commitment.
Residence and employment restrictions place an
affirmative burden on several fundamental liberty interests—where to
live, work, raise a family, and even travel. The freedom to live a lawabiding life in the manner of one’s own choosing should not be
terminated by a criminal conviction. More importantly, it should not be
a result of conviction.
Unlike registration requirements, these
restrictions are a new and unexpected restraint on sex offenders’ lives.181
The ramification of not being able to live and work where you choose is
not a product of the crime; it is a product of the legislation.
Residence and employment restrictions are not like registration
requirements because residence and employment restrictions actually
impose a physical restraint on the sex offender. The Court in Smith v.
Doe found that Alaska’s registration law was not punitive because “the
Act imposes no physical restraint, and so does not resemble the
punishment of imprisonment, which is the paradigmatic affirmative
178. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69.
179. See Michael Louis Corrado, Sex Offenders, Unlawful Combatants and Preventive
Detention, 84 N.C. L. REV. 77 (2005); Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the
Constitution and Courts, 94 GEO. L. J. 1 (2005); Susan R. Klein, Redrawing the Criminal-Civil
Boundary, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 679 (1999); Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of
Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2003).
180. See, e.g., Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 849 (S.D. Iowa 2004), rev’d, 405 F.3d 700
(8th Cir. 2005).
181. Smith, 538 U.S. at 101. “Although the public availability of the information may have a
lasting and painful impact on the convicted sex offender, these consequences flow not from the
Act’s registration and dissemination provisions, but from the fact of conviction, already a matter of
public record.” Id.
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disability of restraint.”182 The Court even goes on to say that “the Act
does not restrain activities sex offenders may pursue but leaves them
free to change jobs or residences.”183 Thus, the Smith Court implies that
a residence or employment restriction might be improper.
The Smith Court does note that particular employment prohibitions
can be legitimate civil sanctions.184 For example, the Court has
authorized the forbidding participation in the banking industry,185
working as a union official186 or revocation of a medical license.187 But
these restrictions are case specific and are related to the underlying
deviant behavior that resulted in such a sanction. Restrictions that
prohibit working within a certain distance of a school or church have no
particular correlation to the previous employment of the sex offender or
the relationship, if any, of the employment to the criminal offense.
These restrictions are an inverted detention. In prison, offenders
are confined to a small space while society continues around it. Under
these residence and employment schemes, the walls are built around
society and the offender is forced to live confined outside them.188
Essentially, towns become gated communities with severe punishments
for trespassers. The issue boils down to the greater of two motives. Do
these invisible walls protect society, punish the offender, or both? If the
objective is to incapacitate the sex offenders so that they cannot reoffend, then that is a form of punishment.189
Unlike civil commitment, which provides some effort at
rehabilitation through counseling and psychological treatment, residence
and employment restrictions confer no benefit on the sex offender.190
182. Smith, 538 U.S. at 100.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997).
186. See De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960).
187. See Hawker v. People of New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
188. See Wayne A. Logan, A Study in “Actuarial Justice”: Sex Offender Classification
Practice and Procedure, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 593, 595-96 (2000) (“To a significant extent, the
laws serve ‘a kind of waste management function,’ a massive corrections experiment taking place
beyond prison walls.”).
189. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *11-*12 (stating an objective of criminal law
is to “depriv[e] the party injuring of the power to do future mischief.”). See also United States v.
Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (“Punishment serves several purposes: retribution, rehabilitation,
deterrent – and preventative. One of the reasons society imprisons those convicted of crimes is to
keep them from inflicting future harm, but that does not make imprisonment any the less
punishment.”). See also HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 3-6 (1968).
190. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369 (1986). See also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346,
381 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer, in his dissent, suggests that withholding or
delaying treatment until the end or near the end of the prison sentence, so that further detention is
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These restrictions are for the protection of the public by removing these
“dangerous” individuals. There is no evidence that these restrictions
will cure a sex offender of his or her deviant actions. In his dissent in
Hendricks, Justice Breyer states, “The Allen Court’s focus upon
treatment, as a kind of touchstone helping to distinguish civil from
punitive purposes, is not surprising, for one would expect a non-punitive
statutory scheme to confine, not simply in order to protect, but also in
order to cure.”191 There needs to be some benefit to all interested
parties: the state and the convicted offender. Protecting society alone is
not enough, especially since there is no proof that these restrictions will
protect society.
Most of the residence and employment zoning restrictions apply
only to a special class of individuals: those who have previously
committed a sexual offense.192 The civil commitment contemplated in
Hendricks involved offenders who had also been adjudged to be
dangerous.193 The Supreme Court has found that an imposition of
restrictive measures on sex offenders adjudged to be dangerous is a
legitimate non-punitive governmental objective.194 What is often
missing from sex offender residence and employment restrictions is a
finding of dangerousness with the individual offenders. The legislative
trend is for residence restrictions to apply to all who are required to
register, with no finding of dangerousness.195 For example, Arkansas
and Louisiana apply these restrictions only on those found to be sexually
violent predators.196 This overbroad classification does not take into
account the life situation of its victims and creates unjustified havoc.
For example, an 80-year-old Lexington, Kentucky, resident “living
in . . . a nursing home, where he is treated for dementia and heart
ailments,” will have to move to the nearest nursing home facility that
satisfies Kentucky’s new harsher residence restrictions—two hours

required, is a scheme that looks punitive. Id.
191. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 382 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 380 (citing Dept. of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 781 (1994)
(finding that a tax on marijuana [is] “conditioned on the commission of a crime . . . is ‘significant of
[its] penal and prohibitory intent’”)).
193. Id. at 363 (majority opinion).
194. Id.
195. Six (Michigan, Idaho, Indiana, Mississippi, South Dakota, and Kentucky) of the Seven
(Virginia) states that created new post-sentence residence restrictions in 2006 were registration
driven. Three (Georgia, Oklahoma, Tennessee) of the four (Missouri) additional states that
amended their previous laws to increase the restrictions in 2006 were also registration driven. See
Table 1.
196. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(a) (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1(A)(2) (2006).
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away.197 These restrictions treat all sex offenders the same regardless if
the offense was a misdemeanor or felony, a first or subsequent offense, a
predatory act or temporary lapse in judgment. The desire of these
restrictions is to keep the handful of truly deviant predators away from
children, but its application is overbearing and punitive on the vast
majority of sex offenders.
Finally, violation of a true regulatory scheme results in a fine or
injunction but certainly does not carry a possible thirty-year prison
term.198 Thirty years is a significant criminal sanction available for only
the most heinous crimes. With these laws in effect, those classified as
sex offenders live their lives in fear that they may inadvertently, and
with no malicious intent, violate these laws and basically throw away the
rest of their lives.199 These restrictions are significant restraints equal to
and perhaps even greater than the punishment received for the
underlying offense.200 There is a severe impact on those who have
served their time but languish under the status of being a sex offender.
Individuals who have paid their debt are now required to pay more.
Subsequent punishments are clear violations of the Ex Post Facto
Clause.
B. Other Constitutional Claims
There is no more fundamental American right than the right to own
property and earn a livelihood.201 That right is guaranteed by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, which require due process before these
interests can be taken away. The tension is between a state’s alleged
exercise of its police power in the interest of the general welfare and the
process by which individuals lose their individual liberty. A state’s
police power does not give it unlimited power over individual liberty.
197. Andrew Wolfson, Sex Offenders Fight Residence Rules, LOUISVILLE COURIER-J., Sept.
21, 2006.
198. Cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(d) (2006).
199. See infra Table 2 (listing mental element requirements for each state).
200. See infra Table 2 (listing punishments for first and subsequent violations).
201. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed,
the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been
definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations
of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.
Id.
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As Justice Harlan stated, “the police power cannot be put forward as an
excuse for oppressive and unjust legislation.”202 When a state is
exercising its police power there must be a balance between the public
and private interests involved in order for the regulations to be
reasonable.203
Sex offender residence and employment restrictions may violate
other constitutional provisions, but analysis of those claims is typically
hindered by the predicate determination that the restrictions are are civil
in nature. For instance, if a court finds the proceedings and actions civil
in nature, then the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
does not attach.204 Similarly, if the court refuses to call sanctions
punishment, then the constitutional scrutiny is greatly diminished.205
A finding that a law is civil in nature effectively thwarts most
constitutional claims. Likewise, a determination that the restrictions are
actually punishment will result in multiple constitutional violations.
Regardless of the number of constitutional deficiencies, a court need
only find one constitutional violation to make an act unconstitutional.
Other constitutional claims are available, but will not be discussed
in this article. They include the following: violation of substantive due
process rights under the 14th Amendment by restricting the right to own
a home in location of one’s own choosing,206 violation of the right to
work207 and the right to travel;208 violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment by treating sex offenders differently than
all other citizens;209 violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the Eighth Amendment;210 violation of the Double Jeopardy
202. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 66 (1905) (dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan),
overruled by Day-Bright Lighting Inc. V. Missouri, 342 U.S. 45 (1952).
203. Dept. of Transp. v. Longo, 510 A.2d 832, 834 (Pa. 1986).
204. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 374-75 (1986).
205. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (finding that deportation is not punishment
and therefore not contrary to the Ex Post Facto Clause).
206. See Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1974). Zoning ordinances that have the effect
of restricting the number of unrelated persons who may live together in a residential zone are not
violative of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection. So long as the zoning ordinance bears a
rational relationship to a permissible state objective, it is constitutional. Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505-06 (1977) (holding that a housing ordinance limiting occupancy of a
dwelling unit to a narrow definition of “family” violated Due Process).
207. See e.g. Wilson v. Loew’s Inc., 355 U.S. 597, 599 (1958). There is a “fundamental right to
work.” Id.
208. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966). See also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S.
489, 498 (1999).
209. See e.g. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S.Ct. 2594 (2006)
(treating people differently for no lawful purpose violates equal protection).
210. These restrictions are often disproportionate to the crime in degree and scope as to make
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Clause;211 and violation of the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination.212
VIII. THE COURT DOES HAVE ITS BREAKING POINT
Even though most of the previous case law has sanctified sex
offender residence and employment restrictions, there does seem to be a
point where the U.S. Supreme Court will say enough is enough. In his
dissent in Hendricks, Justice Kennedy warns that activities such as civil
commitment for sex offenders would cross the line if “[it] were to
become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence, or if it were
shown that mental abnormality is too imprecise a category to offer a
solid basis for concluding that civil commitment is justified, our
precedents would not suffice to validate it.”213 Perhaps it will start with
a willingness to take down a statute that is imprecise in its understanding
and application, such as in Georgia.214 In July 2006, the addition of
school bus stops to the list of places a sex offender cannot live or work
within 1,000 feet was deemed too imprecise because there was no formal
declaration of a school bus stop.215 Or perhaps the Court will conclude
that the classification of sex offenders is too large to precisely indicate
future dangerousness. As legislative bodies continue to push sex
offenders out by adding prohibited places or enlarging the zones around
them unconstitutional. A person convicted of a misdemeanor expects to receive a punishment that
last less than a year. Likewise a person convicted of a felony expects that the maximum amount of
time his liberty would be restricted would be the statutorily established sentencing limits. It was
never contemplated that a misdemeanor conviction would, some ten years after the final disposition,
create a new debilitating restraint on his or her liberty. It is cruel and unusual punishment for a
strict liability crime to carry a severe sanction such as a prison sentence of 10 or more years. It is
fundamentally unfair to imprison someone for a technical violation when there is no evil intent.
Scholars have noted a shift in public opinion regarding strict liability crimes. See Catherine L.
Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public Welfare Offense Model, 53 AM. U. L.
REV. 313, 380 (2003); Carol. S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the
Criminal-Civil Divide, 85 GEO. L. 775 (1997). Yet that is precisely what the residence and
employment restrictions do.
211. A new restraint on liberty after being released from prison should be considered a second
punishment for the same criminal action. See e.g. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 10102 (1997).
212. Every state has some form of registration for sex offenders. Variations exist on the
frequency and the amount of information required depending on the state and the level/classification
of the offender. All registrations require that the offender provide a current residence. It is possible
that in the process of following the law and registering as a sex offender, that an individual may be
unknowingly incriminating himself if the address listed is within a prohibited area.
213. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 373 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
214. See, e.g. Jill Young Miller, Sex Offender Law Muddled, ATLANTA J.-CONSTITUTION, July
26, 2006, at A1, A9.
215. Id.
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the prohibited places and as the punitive intent of these laws becomes
even more evident, reason will win out over passion.
IX. A BETTER SOLUTION
Merely keeping convicted sex offenders away from particular areas
does nothing to keep them away from children or any other potential
victims. A key aspect of most sex offenses is that the assailant and the
victim often have a relationship with each other before the violation
occurs. The stranger danger for sex crimes is actually very low.
Whatever danger is posed, it is probably best handled by educating
children how to act.216 And if there is a desire to separate children from
child sexual offenders, then laws that hinder relationship-building, such
as prohibiting a child sex offender from working at a daycare or school,
would be narrowly tailored, less restrictive and more effective.
A better solution to the problem would be to discontinue the
practice of exiling the convicted sex offenders from the general
population once they have paid their debt to society. If society is so
certain that sex offenders have not paid enough, then perhaps the
incarceration time should increase. At a minimum, some sort of
rehabilitation and treatment should be used throughout the confinement
period so that society could better trust that the person leaving the
penitentiary is changed from the one who entered. Preventing offenders
from being able to reasonably assimilate themselves in the general
population does not serve any legitimate purpose other than making
politicians feel like they are tough on crime.
Instead of simply hoping that incarceration for any length of time
will rehabilitate a sex offender or setting up arbitrary barriers that
debilitate any hope of assimilation, a more prudent approach would be to
provide some comprehensive counseling during incarceration, so that
when sex offenders are released, we can be more hopeful that they will
not re-offend. Alternatively, sex offenders could spend the last portion
of their sentence in a sex offender halfway house, where they could
receive the counseling and assistance needed to rejoin society and
overcome any deviant urges.217 It is presumptively unfair to punish
216. A greater danger for children may come from internet chat-room stalkers. Some of NBC
Dateline’s most popular shows involve catching child predators. Residence and Employment
restrictions would not solve this problem at all. In fact, by keeping some sex offenders unemployed,
the restrictions may give chat-room stalkers more time to chat.
217. For example in Minneapolis, Minnesota, Alpha Human Services offers an Adult
Residential Program specifically designed for repeat sexual offenders. See Alpha Human Services,
www.alphaservices.org, for more information.
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someone for the status crime of being a sex offender, rather than for the
underlying crime. Giving first-time offenders probation with little or no
jail time—but then sentencing them to a felony when they fail to move
from a house they have lived in for the past 10 years without incident—
does not cure any problem. It is merely a means by which sex offenders
can be punished a second time for their crime without running afoul of
any double jeopardy claims.
If it can be proven that a particular amount of time is necessary to
rehabilitate, then that amount of time should be the minimum time
required to be spent by all noteworthy sex offenders. Releasing
individuals before they are competent to control their anti-social desires
and creating a massive system to monitor and track them until the
inevitable day occurs when they re-offend is not in society’s best
interest. Once people serve their full sentences, their debt to society is
paid. They now owe society nothing for their past actions—only the
promise to live debt-free henceforth. If the current punishment is not
sufficient, then it must be increased so that society will receive its
payment upfront, not after the fact. Residence and employment
restrictions re-punish those who do not deserve additional punishment.
That practice is contrary to our ordered scheme of liberty and must
cease. The time has come for the courts to protect the interests of this
helpless group and end this practice.
There is no arguing the fact that sex crimes are terrible. But so are
many different crimes. Everyone makes mistakes.218 It seems that for
this broad spectrum of crimes there is a one-strike-and-you’re-out
policy. With recidivism so low and the likelihood of repentance high, it
is a shame that people like Lori Sue Collins are treated as lepers.219 The
good in her is ignored as she is cast out, away from society, and forced
into a nomadic existence by a twenty-first century lynch mob. If there is
no redemption possible for sex offenders, then why not act accordingly
and lock them up forever or execute them? If not, no matter how much
we hate the sin, we have to reach out to the sinner. We must offer sex
offenders real hope, because without hope, they will act without
conscience; then everyone loses.

218. “For all have sinned and fall short of the Glory of God.” Romans 3:23.
219. See Complaint, supra note 9, ¶¶ 38-45.
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TABLE 1 – SEX OFFENDER RESIDENCE PROHIBITED
ZONES
State

Residence
prohibition
applies to:

What is the
prohibited zone?

Alabama

Persons convicted
of a “criminal sex
offense”220

Arkansas

Persons required
to register as a
sex offender
AND who are
assigned risk
level 3 (high) or 4
(SVP)223
Persons convicted
of certain sex
offenses
involving a child
under 16227

Within 2,000 feet
of any school or
child care
facility221
Within 2,000 feet
of any elementary
or secondary
school or daycare
facility224

Delaware

Within 500 feet of
the property of
any school228

How long is
an offender
subject to the
restriction?
Life222

Possibility
of release?

No

15 years to
life225

Yes226

Life229

No

220. ALA. CODE §§ 15-20-26(a), 15-20-21(1) (Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.).
221. § 15-20-26(a).
222. ALA. CODE § 15-20-33(a) (Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.).
223. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(a) (2006).
224. Id.
225. ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-919(a),(b)(1) (2006).
226. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-917(h), 919(b)(1), 922(b)(1)(a) (2006). A sex offender may
request an administrative review challenging the level 3 or 4 risk assignment, request a risk
reassessment every five years, and petition a court for release from registration requirements after
15 years. By lowering the risk classification to level 1 or 2, or obtaining release from registration
requirements, a sex offender will no longer be subject to the residence restriction.
227. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1112(b)(4) (2006).
228. § 1112(a)(1) (2006).
229. Id. The statute places no limit on the period of time an offender is subject to the residence
prohibition, thus the restriction lasts indefinitely. Id.
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Residence
prohibition
applies to:

What is the
prohibited zone?

Florida

Persons convicted
of certain sex
offenses
involving a child
under 16230
Persons required
to register as a
sex offender233

Within 1,000 feet
of any school, day
care center, park,
or playground231

Georgia

Idaho

Persons required
to register as a
sex offender237

Within 1,000 feet
of any child care
facility, church,
school, or area
where minors
congregate234
Within 500 feet of
the property on
which a school is
located238

How long is
an offender
subject to the
restriction?
Life232

375

Possibility
of release?

No

10 years to
life235

Yes236

10 years to
life239

Yes240

230. FLA. STAT. § 794.065(1) (2006).
231. Id.
232. Id. The statute places no limit on the period of time an offender is subject to the residence
prohibition, thus the restriction lasts indefinitely. Id.
233. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(a) (2006).
234. Id. Georgia’s sex offender residency prohibition was amended in 2006 to 1) make it a
crime to loiter within the prohibited zone, 2) include “churches” among the restricted areas, and 3)
add school bus stops and public/community swimming pools to the definition of “area where
minors congregate.” See H.B, 1059, 148th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006), available at
http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2005_06/versions/hb1059_HB_1059_AP_11.htm.
235. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(g) (2006).
236. Id. Effective July 1, 2006, sexual offenders may petition a court for release from
registration requirements after 10 years. Id. If successful, the offender will no longer be subject to
the residence restriction. Id.
237. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8329(1) (2006).
238. § 18-8329(1)(d).
239. § 18-8310(1).
240. Id. Sex offenders who are not required to register for life may petition a court for release
from registration requirements after 10 years, and, if successful, will no longer be subject to the
residence restriction. Id.
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State

Residence
prohibition
applies to:

What is the
prohibited zone?

Illinois

Persons convicted
of a child sex
offense, or
certified as a
sexually
dangerous person
whose victim was
under 18241
Persons required
to register as a
sex offender who
are 1) sexually
violent predators,
or 2) have been
convicted of
certain offenses
involving a
minor245

Within 500 feet of
any school that
persons under the
age of 18 attend242

Indiana

Within 1,000 feet
of school
property, a youth
program center, or
public park246

[40:339

How long is
an offender
subject to the
restriction?
Life243

10 years to
life247

Possibility
of release?

No244

Yes248

241. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(b-5), (c)(1) (2006).
242. Id. § 5/11-9.3(b-5).
243. Id. The statute places no limit on the period of time an offender is subject to the residence
prohibition, thus the restriction lasts indefinitely. Id.
244. A “sexually dangerous person” may appeal the designation. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/9
(2006). But, even if successful, the offender will remain subject to the residence prohibition if
his/her underlying conviction is a qualifying child sex offense.
245. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-11(a) (West 2006).
246. § 35-42-4-11(c).
247. IND. CODE ANN. § 11-8-8-19 (West 2006).
248. Id. The duty to register, and consequently the residence restriction, terminates after 10
years for certain offenders. A sexually violent predator may petition a court to have the SVP status
removed 10 years after the initial classification. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-7.5(g) (West 2006).
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State

Residence
prohibition
applies to:

What is the
prohibited zone?

Iowa

Persons who have
committed a
criminal,
aggravated,
sexually violent,
or other offense
involving a
minor249
Persons required
to register as a
sex offender252

Within 2,000 feet
of a elementary or
secondary school
or child care
facility250

Kentucky

Louisiana

Sexually violent
predators256

Within 1,000 feet
of a school,
preschool, public
playground, or
day care facility253
Within 1,000 feet
of any elementary
or secondary
school, day care,
playground, youth
center, public
swimming pool,
or free standing
video arcade257

How long is
an offender
subject to the
restriction?
Life251

377

Possibility
of release?

No

20 years to
life254

Yes255

Life258

No259

249. IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.2A(1), (2) (West 2006).
250. § 692A.2A(2).
251. Id. The statute places no limit on the period of time an offender is subject to the residence
prohibition, thus the restriction lasts indefinitely.
252. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.545(1) (West 2006).
253. Id.
254. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.520(2)(a), (3) (West 2006).
255. Id. Sex offenders who are not required to register for life are automatically released from
registration requirements, and consequently the residence restriction, after 20 years. Id.
256. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1(A)(2) (2006).
257. Id.
258. Id. The statute places no limit on the period of time an offender is subject to the residence
prohibition, thus the restriction lasts indefinitely. Id.
259. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:542.1 (2006) (containing no provision for reconsideration
of the SVP classification after the sentencing court makes the initial determination). Section 2 of
Acts 1999, No. 594 repealed paragraph (B)(4) of this section which allowed the defendant to
petition the sentencing court annually for review of the SVP designation. Id.
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State

Residence
prohibition
applies to:

What is the
prohibited zone?

Michigan

Persons required
to register as a
sex offender260
Persons required
to register as a
sex offender264

Within 1,000 feet
of school
property261

Mississippi

Missouri

Persons convicted
of certain sex
offenses268

Ohio

Persons convicted
of a sexually
oriented offense
or child-victim
oriented
offense271

Within 1,500 feet
of any elementary
or secondary
school or child
care facility265
Within 1,000 feet
of any school or
childcare
facility269
Within 1,000 feet
of any school
premises272

[40:339

How long is
an offender
subject to the
restriction?
10 years to
life262

Possibility
of release?

Yes263

10 years to
life266

Yes267

Life270

No

Life273

No

260. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.735(1) (2006).
261. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 28.735(1), 733(f) (2006).
262. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.725(6), (7) (2006).
263. Id. Sex offenders who are not required to register for life are automatically released from
registration requirements, and consequently the residence restriction, after 10 to 25 years. Id.
264. MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-25(4)(a) (2006).
265. Id.
266. MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-47(2)(a) (2006).
267. Id. Sex offenders who are not required to register for life may petition a court for release
from registration requirements after 10 years, and, if successful, will no longer be subject to the
residence restriction. Id.
268. MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.147(1) (West 2006).
269. Id.
270. The statute places no limit on the period of time an offender is subject to the residence
prohibition, thus the restriction lasts indefinitely. See id.
271. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.031(A) (West 2006).
272. Id.
273. Id. The statute places no limit on the period of time an offender is subject to the residence
prohibition, thus the restriction lasts indefinitely. Id.
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State

Residence
prohibition
applies to:

What is the
prohibited zone?

Oklahoma

Persons registered
as a sex
offender274

South
Dakota

Persons required
to register as a
sex offender278

Tennessee

Persons required
to register as a
sex offender
whose victim was
a minor282

Within 2,000 feet
of any school,
educational
institution, park,
playground, or
childcare
facility275
Within 500 feet of
any school, public
park, playground,
or public pool279
Within 1,000 feet
of any school, day
care/child care
facility, public
park, playground,
recreation center,
or athletic field283

How long is
an offender
subject to the
restriction?
10 years to
life276

379

Possibility
of release?

Yes277

10 years to
life280

Yes281

10 years to
life284

Yes285

274. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 590 (West 2006).
275. Id.
276. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 583(C), 584(J) (West 2006).
277. Id. Sex offenders who are not required to register for life are automatically released from
registration requirements, and consequently the residence restriction, after 10 years. Id.
278. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24B-23 (2006).
279. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-24B-23, 22-24B-22(1) (2006).
280. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-24B-27 (2006).
281. Id. A sex offender may petition a court 10 years after conviction for release from the
residency restriction. Id.
282. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-211(a) (2006).
283. Id.
284. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-207(a), (f)(1) (2006).
285. § 40-39-207(c). Sex offenders who are not required to register for life may petition the
Tennessee Bureau of Investigation for release from registration requirements after 10 years, and, if
successful, will no longer be subject to the residence restriction.
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State

Residence
prohibition
applies to:

What is the
prohibited zone?

Virginia

Adults convicted
of certain sex
offenses where
the offender is
more than 3 years
older than the
victim286

Within 500 feet of
the premises of a
child day center,
or primary,
secondary, or high
school287

[40:339

How long is
an offender
subject to the
restriction?
Life288

Possibility
of release?

No

286. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-370.3(A) (2006).
287. Id.
288. Id. The offender “shall be forever prohibited from residing” within the prohibited zone.
Id.
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TABLE 2 –
PROHIBITED ZONE

PENALTIES

FOR

State

Felony/Misdemeanor

Punishment 1st Violation

Alabama

Class C felony289

Arkansas

Class D felony292

Delaware

Class G felony295

Florida

First degree
misdemeanor or third
degree felony
depending on the
degree of punishment
for the qualifying sex
offense298
Felony

Imprisonment,
1 to 10
years290
Imprisonment,
up to 6
years293
Imprisonment,
up to 2
years296
Misdemeanor,
imprisonment
up to 1 year;
felony,
imprisonment
up to 5
years299
Imprisonment,
10 to 30 years

Georgia301

RESIDING

381

WITHIN

Punishment 2nd or
Subsequent
Violations
Same

Knowingly291

Same

Knowingly294

Same

Strict
Liability297

Same

Strict
Liability300

Same

Knowingly

Mental
Element

289. ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(h) (Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.).
290. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-6(a)(3) (Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.).
291. § 15-20-26(h).
292. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(d) (2006).
293. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-401(a)(5) (2006).
294. § 5-14-128(d).
295. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1112(a)(1) (2006).
296. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4205(b)(7) (2006).
297. The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. See tit. 11, §
1112(a)(1).
298. FLA. STAT. § 794.065(1) (2006).
299. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(3)(d), (4)(a) (2006).
300. The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. See §
794.065.
301. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(d) (2006).
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State

Felony/Misdemeanor

Punishment 1st Violation

Idaho

Misdemeanor302

Illinois

Class 4 felony305

Indiana

Class D felony308

Iowa

Aggravated
misdemeanor311

Kentucky

First violation is a
Class A
misdemeanor. Second
or subsequent
violation is a Class D
felony.314

Imprisonment,
up to 6
months, fine
up to $1,000,
or both303
Imprisonment,
1 to 3 years306
Imprisonment,
6 months to 3
years, and fine
not more than
$10,000309
Imprisonment,
up to 2 years,
and fine of
$500 to
$5,000312
Imprisonment,
up to 1 year315

[40:339

Punishment 2nd or
Subsequent
Violations
Same

Mental
Element

Strict
Liability304

Same

Knowingly307

Same

Knowingly,
intentionally310

Same

Strict
Liability313

Imprisonment,
1 to 5 years316

Strict
Liability317

302. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8329(1) (2006).
303. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-113(1) (2006).
304. The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. See § 188329(1)(d).
305. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(d) (2006).
306. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-1(a)(7) (2006).
307. § 5/11-9.3(b-5).
308. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-11 (West 2006).
309. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-7(a) (West 2006).
310. § 35-42-4-11.
311. IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.2A(3) (West 2006).
312. IOWA CODE ANN. § 903.1(2) (West 2006).
313. The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. See IOWA
CODE ANN. § 692A.2A(2).
314. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.545(3) (West 2006).
315. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.090(1) (West 2006).
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State

Felony/Misdemeanor

Punishment 1st Violation

Punishment 2nd or
Subsequent
Violations

Mental
Element

Louisiana318

Misdemeanor

Same

Strict
Liability319

Michigan320

First violation is a
misdemeanor. Second
or subsequent
violation is a felony.
Felony

Imprisonment,
up to 6
months, fine
not to exceed
$1,000, or
both
Imprisonment
up to 1 year,
$1,000 fine,
or both
Imprisonment
up to 5 years,
fine up to
$5,000, or
both
Imprisonment,
up to 4
years325

Imprisonment
up to 2 years,
$2,000 fine,
or both
Same

Strict
Liability321

Imprisonment,
5 to 15
years326

Strict
Liability327

Mississippi322

Missouri

First violation is a
class D felony.
Second or subsequent
violation is a class B
felony.324

Strict
Liability323

316. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.060(2)(d) (West 2006).
317. The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. See KY. §
17.545(1).
318. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1(E) (2006).
319. The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. See id. §
14:91.1(A)(2).
320. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.735(2)(a), (b) (2006).
321. The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. See MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 28.735(1) (2006).
322. MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-33(2) (2006).
323. The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. See MISS.
CODE ANN. § 35-33-25(4)(a) (2006)
324. MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.147(4) (West 2006).
325. MO. ANN. STAT. § 558.011(1) (West 2006).
326. Id.
327. The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. See MO.
CODE. ANN. § 566.147(1).
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State

Felony/Misdemeanor

Punishment 1st Violation

Punishment 2nd or
Subsequent
Violations

Mental
Element

Ohio328

A person who violates
the prohibition is
subject to an action
for injunctive relief
Misdemeanor

Injunction

Injunction

Strict
Liability329

Fine not to
exceed $3,000

Willfully,
intentionally

South
Dakota

First violation is a
class 6 felony;
subsequent violations
are class 5 felonies331

Tennessee

Class E felony335

Same

Knowingly337

Virginia

Class 6 felony338

Imprisonment
for 2 years, or
fine of
$4,000, or
both332
Imprisonment,
1 to 6 years336
Imprisonment,
1 to 5 years;
or, jail up to
12 months
and fine up to
$2,500339

One year in
county jail in
addition to the
fine
Imprisonment
for 5 years.
Optional fine
of $10,000.333

Same

Knowingly340

Oklahoma330

Strict
Liability334

328. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.031(B) (West 2006).
329. The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. See id. §
2950.031(A).
330. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 590 (West 2006).
331. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24B-23 (2006).
332. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-6-1(9) (2006).
333. § 22-6-1(8).
334. The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. See § 2224B-23.
335. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-211(e) (2006).
336. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-112 (2006).
337. § 40-39-211(a).
338. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-370.3(A) (2006).
339. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10(f) (2006).
340. § 18.2-370.3(A).
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TABLE 3 – SEX OFFENDER EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS
State

Employment
prohibition
applies to:

Alabama

Persons convicted
of a “criminal sex
offense”341

Alabama

Persons convicted
of a criminal sex
offense involving
a child344

Florida

Sexual
predators347

Where is the
offender
prohibited from
working?
Within 2,000 feet
of any school or
child care
facility342
Within 500 feet of
any school, child
care facility, park,
athletic field or
facility, or other
business or facility
having a principal
purpose of caring
for, educating, or
entertaining
minors345
At any business,
school, day care
center, park,
playground, or
other place where
children regularly
congregate348

How long is
an offender
subject to the
restriction?
Life343

No

Life346

No

30 years to
life349

Yes350

Possibility
of release?

341. ALA. CODE §§ 15-20-26(a), 15-20-21(1) (Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.).
342. § 15-20-26(a).
343. ALA. CODE § 15-20-33(a) (Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.).
344. §§ 15-20-26(g), 15-20-21(1).
345. §§ 15-20-26(g).
346. § 15-20-33(a).
347. FLA. STAT. § 775.21(10)(b) (2006).
348. Id.
349. Id. § 775.21(6)(l).
350. Id. A sexual predator may petition a court for removal of the sexual predator designation
30 years after release. Id.
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State

Employment
prohibition
applies to:

Georgia

Persons required
to register as a sex
offender351

Georgia

Sexually
dangerous
predators355

Idaho

Persons required
to register as a sex
offender358

Indiana

Sexually violent
predators362

Where is the
offender
prohibited from
working?
Within 1,000 feet
of any child care
facility, school, or
church352
Within 1,000 feet
of an area where
minors
congregate356
At a day care
center, group day
care facility, or
family day care
home359
On school
property, at youth
program centers,
or public parks363

[40:339

How long is
an offender
subject to the
restriction?
10 years to
life353

Possibility
of release?

Yes354

Life357

No

10 years to
life360

Yes361

10 years to
life364

Yes365

351. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(b)(1) (2006).
352. Id.
353. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(g) (2006).
354. Id. Effective July 1, 2006, sexual offenders may petition a court for release from
registration requirements after 10 years. Id. If successful, the offender will no longer be subject to
the employment restriction. Id.
355. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(b)(2).
356. Id. “Area where minors congregate” includes: public and private parks and recreation
facilities, playgrounds, skating rinks, neighborhood centers, gymnasiums, school bus stops, and
public/community swimming pools. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(3).
357. See GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-14 (2006) (containing no provisions for reconsideration of the
“sexually dangerous predator” designation after the initial determination is final).
358. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8327(1) (2006).
359. Id.
360. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8310(1) (2006).
361. After 10 years, a sex offender may 1) if not required to register for life, petition a court for
release from registration requirements, and 2) petition a court for relief from the employment
prohibition. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-8310(1), 18-8328. If successful with either petition, the
offender will no longer be subject to the employment restriction. Id.
362. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-10(b) (West 2006) (effective July 1, 2006).
363. Id.
364. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-7.5(g) (West 2006).
365. Id. A sexually violent predator may petition a court to have the SVP status removed 10
years after the initial classification. Id.
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State

Employment
prohibition
applies to:

Michigan

Persons required
to register as a sex
offender366
Persons convicted
of a “listed [sex]
offense”370

Michigan

Oklahoma

Registered sex
offenders372

Tennessee

Persons required
to register as a sex
offender whose
victim was a
minor376

387

Where is the
offender
prohibited from
working?
Within 1,000 feet
of school
property367

How long is
an offender
subject to the
restriction?
10 years to
life368

By a school or
allowed to work
under contract in a
school371
To work with or
provide services to
children or work
on school
premises373
Within 1,000 feet
of any school, day
care/child care
facility, public
park, playground,
recreation center,
or athletic field377

N/A

N/A

10 years to
life374

Yes375

10 years to
life378

Yes379

Possibility
of release?

Yes369

366. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.734(1)(a) (2006).
367. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 28.734(1)(a), 28.733(f) (2006).
368. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.725(6), (7) (2006).
369. Id. Sex offenders who are not required to register for life are automatically released from
registration requirements, and consequently the employment restriction, after 10 to 25 years. Id.
370. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1230a(10) (2006).
371. Id. Interestingly, the statute gives discretion to the school board to approve the hiring of a
non-sex felon, but not a sex offender. Id.
372. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 589(A) (West 2006).
373. Id.
374. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 583(C), 584(J) (West 2006).
375. Id. Sex offenders who are not required to register for life are automatically released from
registration requirements, and consequently the employment restriction, after 10 years. Id.
376. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-211(a) (2006).
377. Id.
378. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-207(a), (f)(1) (2006).
379. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-207(c) (2006). Sex offenders who are not required to register
for life may petition the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation for release from registration
requirements after 10 years, and, if successful, will no longer be subject to the employment
restriction. Id.
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State

Employment
prohibition
applies to:

Virginia

Adults convicted
of certain sex
offenses where
the offender is
more than 3 years
older than the
victim380

Where is the
offender
prohibited from
working?
On public or
private elementary
or secondary
school or child
day care center
property381

[40:339

How long is
an offender
subject to the
restriction?
Life382

Possibility
of release?

No

380. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-370.4(A) (2006).
381. Id.
382. Id. The offender “shall be forever prohibited from working” in the prohibited area. Id.
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Appendix 1:
http://www.webstercity.com/departments/police_dept/692a.2a_map.asp
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